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Summary findings
Schiavo-Campo,  de Tommaso,  and Mukherjee  try to  market  failures  - as these  government  roles  happen  to
replace  myths  about  government  pay and  employmenit  be defined  in the  country  in question.
with  reliable  facts from  a survey  of  international,  Civil service  reform  can begin  with  various  diagnostic
national,  and primary  sources  for about  100  countries  in  and  fact-finding  activities.  The  key measures  concern
the  early  1990s.  The  study  also  outlines  the  general  rightsizing,  incentives,  and accountability.  These  are all
nature  of civil service  problems  in the  different  regions.  relative  notions:  the  right  size of the workforce  depends
Nevertheless,  while  the  facts are useful  to "flag"  possible  on the  roles  assigned  to government;  wage  adequacy
problems  and initiate  a dialogue,  recommendations  for  depends  on private  compensation  levels;  and  strengthen-
reform  must  be based  on country-specific  analysis.  ing of accountability  must  define  accountability  for what
Globally,  governiment  employment  is negatively  and to whom.  When  retrenchment  is warranted,  it must
associated  with wages,  and  positively  with  the  fiscal  be carried  out  with  great  care to avoid  skill reduction,
deficit  (although  the  availability  of  financing  is more  demoralization,  and  lower-quality  service.  Adequate
important)  and  with per  capita  income  (confirming  compensation  is a must,  and wage  compression  is to be
"Wagner's  L.aw"). But the global  results  stem  almost  avoided.  But performance  bonuses,  popular  in some
entirely  from  strong  results  for Africa and  Latin America.  advanced  countries,  have been  only  marginally  effective
Civil service  reform  has suffered  in the past  from  an  in improving  performance  in developing  countries,  even
overemphasis  on retrenchment  for  fiscal reasons.  Its true  in the  private  sector.  And they  can be dangerous  in
objective,  for each  country,  is to achieve  a civil service  of  countries  with  ethnic,  clan,  or  religious  conflicts.  Finally,
the  size and  skill-mix,  incentives,  professional  ethos,  and  improvements  in accountability  will most  often  require
accountability  needed  to provide  public  goods,  help  greater  external  openness  and  systematic  feedback  from
formulate  and  enforce  the rules,  and intervene  to remedy  service  users.
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EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY
Why does a sound civil service matter?
An efficient, motivated and effective civil service is very important  in five areas:
*  Governance-- a good civil service is necessary but not sufficient for good governance; a very
bad civil service is sufficient but not necessary for bad governance.  Thus, a dilapidated  civil
service has been a key factor in Africa's economic decline.  Conversely, a strong civil service
is one of several reasons why in much of East Asia, authoritarianism  has co-existed with
excellent economic performance;
*  Production and distribution  of public goods and services-- it makes no sense for the
analysis of public production  to exclude consideration of the size and quality of the public
workforce and of improvements in the institutional rules which guide its behavior;
*  Economic policy-- "enabling reforms" (e.g., removing price controls) do not critically
depend  upon requisite administrative capacity, "affirmative reforms"  (e.g., enterprise
restructuring)  do;
*  Fiscal policy implementation-- public expenditure management  and efficient tax
administration  (a subset of the economic policy issue) are impossible without  a competent
and motivated civil service;
*  Fiscal sustainability-- the fiscal burden of the wage bill is considerable in countries with a
large government,  and efficient downsizing  of government calls for intelligent ways to
reduce numbers  of public employees. However, it matters not only how much the wage bill
is reduced, but how it is reduced;
Beyond mere cost containment, therefore, the broad aim of civil service reform is the
creation of a government workforce of the size and with the skills, incentives, ethos, and
accountability needed to provide quality public services and carry out the functions assigned to
the state in the specific country.
Government  employment  and pay in global perspective
Methodological  problems  render an important initial caveat imperative.  Cross-country
comparisons are always hazardous,  but particularly so in the area of "civil service"
employment and wages.  These problems preclude the inclusion of all countries.  Nevertheless,
we were able to collect and verify government  employment and wage data for 80-100  countries
in the early 1990s:  the largest such survey to-date.  These data are shown, by country, in the
companion paper, and the regional averages are shown in the text tables.  The text tables and
the regional averages are based only on countries for which reliable data could be found or
estimated concerning: central government administration  employment; local government
administration  employment; teachers; and health personnel.  Most of the data were either
collected, or verified with the help of country economists at the Bank and IMF, and of Bank- vi  -
Resident Missions.  It is, however, essential to note that all such data can serve only as pointers
for further analysis, and country-specific knowledge is required for meaningful interpretation.
The key findings on employment  are as follows:
*  Worldwide, total government  civilian employment  currently averages (on an unweighted
basis) about 4.7% of population.  It is relatively largest in the developed  market economies
of the OECD (7.7%  of population),  second largest in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union (Europe and Central Asia - ECA), at 6.9% of population; and relatively smallest in
Africa and Asia (respectively, 2.0% and 2.6%  of population).  Latin America and the
Caribbean (LAC), and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are in between, with
government  employment accounting for about 3.0% and 3.9% of population  respectively;
*  Relative to total employment, the inter-regional differences are much less marked, because
of the significantly lower labor participation rate and higher unemployment  in developing
regions.  The regional rankings change somewhat.  Worldwide, civilian government
employment accounts on average for about 11%  of total employment, with MENA countries
highest at 17.5  %, OECD at 17.2%,  ECA and LAC at 16.0%  and 8.9%, respectively, and
Africa and Asia at the low end with 6.7% and 6.3%,  respectively;
- The picture changes if teachers and health personnel are excluded.  The central
administration  in ECA is comparatively not large, and is small in the former Soviet
republics. Among developing regions, central administration  is largest in the Middle East
and North Africa. Overall, government  administration  employment in developing regions,
at 1.8%  of population,  is less than half the relative size in OECD countries.  Education and
health personnel, too, average in developing regions (excluding ECA) less than half the
level of OECD countries;
*  During the 1980s,  local government  administration  has grown to almost equal employment
in central administration.  Clearly, civil service reform efforts are badly incomplete if they
do not include consideration of local government and of teaching and health personnel;
*  Predictably, inter-country and inter-regional variance is smallest for overall government
employment, than for either central or local administration  or for education and health
personnel.  The inter-country variability of government  employment is the only category
for which there is no difference between the industrial  and developing  country groups,
suggesting that the range of choices on the role of government  does not diminish with
economic growth.  If there is a tendency toward  "convergence" in public administration,  it
is certainly not borne out by the facts of government employment;
*  The very high variance of teaching and health personnel in ECA results from a difference
between Eastern Europe and the former USSR-with  public employment in social sectors
relatively much lower in Eastern Europe.  To some extent, these sub-regional differences
existed before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. But in part, the difference is due to greater
efforts in Eastern Europe since 1989  to improve education and health service efficiency and,
to that extent, reduce personnel requirements;- vii  -
*  Finally, however obvious, it is essential to point out that differences in government  size, by
themselves, show broad trends  and "flag" possible concerns, but cannot be allowed to form
the basis for policy recommendations. An in-depth country-specific analysis is needed to
justify any recommendation concerning the size of government  employment.
On wages,  the key findings are:
*  For the entire sample, the central government wage bill absorbs about 5.4% of GDP. With
wage rates for local government  roughly estimated at about three-fourths of central
government  wages, (and employment in local government  about equal to that in central
government),  total civilian government  salaries can be estimated to absorb about 9% of GDP
as a worldwide  average;
*  The heaviest fiscal weight of the central government wage bill is in the Middle East and
North Africa (9.8%  of GDP), followed by Africa at 6.7% of GDP. Asia, the OECD countries
and Latin America are all between 4.5% and 5% of GDP, and the lowest percentage of GDP
is accounted for by the central government wage bill in Eastern Europe and former USSR
(although from the greater incidence of in-kind benefits);
*  When measured  as a multiple of per capita GDP, central government wages appear higher
in Africa than in any other region, apparently  contrary to widespread  evidence concerning
deterioration  of public wages in Africa. This finding, however, is largely due to the lower
participation  rate in African countries and the higher (although unquantifiable)  degree of
underestimation  of informal production  and thus of GDP per capita.  Furthermore, the
African average is influenced by comparatively high salaries in franc-zone countries,  which
are 9-11 times per capita GDP;
*  Conversely, the relatively low wage multiplier for OECD countries is related to the higher
participation rate as well as the much higher GDP and smaller skill differentials between
public employees and the rest of the working population;
*  The lowest relative public wages are found in ECA; in this case, the figure is less misleading
than the simple multiple of per capita GDP, because "private" employees in the region also
receive a variety of in-kind benefits. The highest government wages are found in the
Middle East and North Africa, about one-third higher than comparable private
compensation.
We must again sound the same caveat here as for employment: specific wage policy
recommendations  cannot be based on such aggregate evidence as presented here.
Trends  in the 1980s
Central government  employment and wages reveal the following trends over the last
decade, based on a smaller sample used by Heller and Tait in 1983:
*  A large contraction in both central government  employment (relative to population) and the
relative wage bill is evident in all regions, with the relative size of central government- viii  -
shrinking by about one-third when measured by employment and one-fourth when
measured by the wage bill;
*  Over the last 10-15  years, central government employment decreased in relative terms
across the board, from about 2.5% of population  to 1.5%;
*  Among developing regions, the reduction in relative government  employment took place in
Africa and Asia.  In Asia, this reduction was partly offset by growth in local government.  In
LAC, an equally impressive reduction in central personnel is almost entirely explained by a
vast shift from central to local government.  In Africa, total government  employment  fell in
the 1980s  both relative to population  and slightly in absolute terms;
*  Central government  wages fell in the 1980s  by about 14%  when measured as a multiple of
per capita GDP. However, the decline was slight in OECD countries and substantial  in
Africa, with government salaries holding their own in LAC, and apparently increasing in
Asia.  Thus, it is developments in Africa which are largely responsible for the decline in
relative government  wages worldwide.  Furthermore, this decline occurred during a decade
of economic deterioration and negative growth in Africa. In the 1980s,  consequently, while
the economic welfare of the average civil servant improved slightly worldwide,  and
significantly in Asia, it declined sharply in Africa;
*  For the developing country sample as a whole, the decline in the relative weight of the
central government  wage bill in the 1980s  was a remarkable 28%.
Determinants  of government employment
According to Wagner's Law, the government tends to expand in relative size as the
economy grows--both because of a consensus in favor of enlarging access to social services and
because of a tendency for all large organizations to expand.  Earlier studies gave some support
to this proposition, and also brought out the positive association of government  employment
with education levels, availability of financing, and of course, population.
This study, based on a larger data set, confirms that population  is by far the largest
single influence on government  employment levels, swamping the influence of any other
variable.  However, beyond this rather obvious finding, we have estimated the influence on
employment relative to population  of the following variables:  (i) per capita income; (ii)
government wages relative to per capita income; (iii)  the fiscal deficit relative to GDP; and (iv)
population  itself. The equation has been estimated globally for each region, and separately for
central govemment  administration,  local govemment administration,  and public employment
in the social sectors.
Taken  as a whole, the results are consistently significant. With respect to the individual
variables, the association with all three categories of relative govemment  employment is close
and positive for per capita income (confirming Wagner's Law); and close and negative for
relative wages (confirming the standard  expectation). For population,  a significant, and
negative, association is found only with relative central govemment  employment in OECD and
LAC countries (suggesting economies of scale in highly-developed  central administrations).- ix-
And the expected positive association of central government  employment with the fiscal deficit
is visible only in some developing regions--and then very weakly--with no significant
relationship emerging anywhere else or for other categories of government employment.
Clearly, it is the availability of financing which matters--as found in earlier studies--and not the
size of the deficit per se.
The global findings, however, are derived largely from strong results in Africa and
LAC. In ECA, the lack of significant results is only to be expected, given the special data
difficulties and the magnitude  and fluidity of the transition.  In Asia, it would  appear that
country-specific characteristics (other than income, wages, the deficit or population)  are
dominant; more detailed research, however, is needed before ruling out the influence of per
capita income or of relative wages on government  employment in that region.  On balance,
therefore, there is conclusive evidence that in developing  countries relative government
employment, other things being equal, is higher where per capita income is higher and relative
wages are lower.
In OECD countries, the only significant association is the one previously noted between
population  and central government  employment.  The lack of association between government
employment and per capita income is particularly interesting, suggesting  either that the
Wagner tendency was counteracted by deliberate policy in the 1980s,  or that 'Wagner's  Law"
becomes inoperative beyond a certain level of development  (or both).  Naturally, what
association is statistically detected says nothing about causality or its direction.  Concerning
employment, the Wagner tendency is just that, a tendency, which can be counteracted  by
deliberate policy, offset by other factors, or ceases to operate beyond a certain level.
Concerning wages, it cannot be inferred from sectional data that wages would rise (or fall) if
employment were reduced  (or increased) in any particular country.  All one can say is the
obvious, albeit powerful, statement that retrenchment offers the possibility of improving
employee compensation, while employment expansion carries a strong risk of eroding wages.
Different regions,  different  problems
In sub-Saharan  Africa, the civil service has sharply deteriorated  in capability,
incentives, integrity and morale since the 1970s. Beginning in the 1980s,  a succession of fiscal
stabilization programs  has reduced government  employment in Africa to the lowest level of
any developing region.  These programs have at least succeeded in limiting the fiscal burden of
government  employment, but have generally not addressed the severe structural problems of
the public administration.  Thus, though additional  downsizing may be necessary in some
countries, most do not need to shrink the workforce but to overhaul the entire civil service
system.  Disappointingly, with few exceptions, civil service reform in Africa has been limited to
tinkering around  the edges.  Cost containment has been the entire story.  Unfortunately,
because of the low level of wages (especially at higher rarnks),  any genuine improvement  in the
civil service is likely to be fiscally costly. More generally, it is difficult to imagine how the civil
service can be reformed on a lasting basis in most African countries without substantial
improvements in governance: accountability, transparency,  and adherence to the rule of law.
Civil service reform--structurally  complex, politically problematic, fiscally expensive--is as
daunting in Africa as it is essential.Civil service systems in East Asia are generally seen as efficient, motivated, and
professional.  Indeed, it can be argued that the correlation evident in Africa between
authoritarianism  and economic decline is not found in East Asian countries partly because of
their strong civil services. Although greater responsiveness  and openness can legitimately be
demanded  of public administrations in some East Asian countries, civil service systems cannot
be considered a problem; they are, rather, part of the solution to these countries'  other
problems.  The situation is markedly different in South Asia, where civil service reform is a top
priority.  In contrast to Africa, the main problem in South Asia is not a demotivated  and
unskilled civil service but bloated public employment, which is both a cause and a result of
overregulation.  Thus, regulatory  simplification and the contraction of public employment,
although complex and politically difficult, could raise economic efficiency, improve the fiscal
situation, and reduce corruption  at the same time.
In the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)  and the
Commonwealth of Independent  States (CIS), in addition to the large variation in country
experiences, broad differences exist between the CEE countries as a group and the CIS
countries.  While all face a common challenge of economic and political transformation--and
hence of a fundamental reorientation  in state structures, the CIS countries (except Russia) face
the gigantic, and historically unique, double challenge of economic transformation  and state
building.  In the CEE countries, progress in building a neutral and accountable civil service has
been significant (especially in Central Europe--much less so in South-eastern Europe).  In the
CIS,  instead, the process of re-orienting the state toward  "steering not rowing" is still at an
early stage, low administrative state capability is a serious and mounting  obstacle to progress in
economic and social areas, and a host of severe problems has emerged from a general lack of
accountability and transparency.  These problems give rise not only to enormous economic
cost, but also to the pervasive corruption which is rightly decried almost everywhere in the
region.  They include, in addition  to the extreme weakness of the civil service and of the central
government  administration,  fuzzy boundaries between private and public property, heavy
regulation, and a weak and inefficient judicial system.
In several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean,  central government
administration  still suffers from inefficiency, waste, and corruption.  However, extensive
decentralization in Latin America over the past decade has had positive repercussions  on
overall administrative efficiency and the quality of public services. Decentralization has also
been a major factor in the improvements in representative  governance throughout  the region.
The key challenge now facing countries in the region (in addition to remedying continuing
weaknesses of the central civil service) is to assure that decentralization  does not dilute
accountability and weaken those government functions--primarily, macroeconomic
programming  and monitoring--that need to remain centralized.
In the Middle East and North  Africa, large central administrations  were built up to
handle the vast responsibilities assigned to the state in the 1960s  and  1970s (and to guarantee
employment for college graduates).  Many governments in the region are now beginning to
turn their attention to public administration  inefficiency and the heavy fiscal weight of the
central government  wage bill (currently averaging almost 10  per cent of GDP). However, civil
service reform in this region is intertwined with issues of governance and the delicate
interaction of religion and society.  Although these issues do not justify avoiding necessary- xi  -
adjustments, reforms need to be formulated and implemented in a manner consistent with the
region's special circumstances.
Finally, contradicting some earlier findings, there is only a slight and very weak
relationship  (if any) between the degree of decentralization, as measured by employment, and
either per capita income or country size--in any region.
Civil service reform
Retrenchment
Rightsizing is a relative notion. That central government  employment may be high in a
particular country is a useful "flag" for analysis, but proves nothing in and of itself. The role of
the government  and degree of centralization vary from country to country.  Determining the
"right size" of a government  workforce must be done on a country-by-country  basis, taking
into account the functions assigned to the state in that country, the degree of centralization, the
skills profile, and, of course, the fiscal outlook.
When downsizing  is necessary, it should not be approached  as an end in itself or merely
as a reaction to fiscal problems.  Without careful planning and respect for the "law of
unintended  consequences", retrenchment  programs  carry major risks. The short-term risk is
skill reduction, if the program inadvertently  encourages the best people to leave. The medium-
term risk is recurrence of overstaffing, if personnel management  and control systems are not
strengthened.  Long-term risks include staff demoralization, lower-quality service and loss of
credibility, if retrenchment  is perceived as arbitrary and opaque, particularly  in societies ridden
with ethnic, clan or religious conflicts.
Wage Policy
The short-term fiscal savings from compressing wages are obvious but must not be
allowed to drive wage policy.  Wage adequacy, like overstaffmg, is also a relative concept.
Determining the adequacy of wages requires a country-specific, in-depth comparison of public-
private wage differentials for comparable skills. The more "market-oriented"  approach of
raising wages if skills are being lost and limiting them if there is a surfeit of applicants is
generally impractical in developing  countries.  Certainly, when public wages are too high
relative to private wages, public wage cuts improve both resource allocation and equity.
However, developing countries typically have barely competitive or inadequate public wages.
In these cases, public wage cuts set in motion a vicious circle of demotivation,
underperformance,  and justification for further reductions.  (Fortunately, the reverse may also
be true:  even small wage increases can trigger a positive dynamic).
The classic problem in wage policy is how to value the labor that produces the output  of
civil servants, given that such output is generally not marketable.  The general solution is to
make compensation comparable (not equal) to that for equivalent skills which are marketed,
i.e., private sector pay.  Civil service compensation operates in practice within the broad
framework of public sector compensation, legislative oversight and judicial review of
administrative/executive  action. There are four major objectives of public compensation
policy, rarely met in practice:- xii  -
*  Equal pay for equal work performed under the same conditions;
*  Differences in pay should  be based on differences in work, responsibilities, and
qualifications;
*  Levels of government  pay comparable to those in the private sector;
*  Levels of government  compensation should be periodically reviewed and systematically
revised to assure the continued validity of the compensation plan.
In actual practice, implementation  of compensation packages raises various  issues, two
of the most contentious being the treatment  of non-wage benefits, and the salary inequality
between men and women.  In the former issue, the difficulty in identifying and quantifying
non-wage civil service benefits creates major problems for comparing private and public sector
compensation, and also for cross-country comparisons.  It also makes it difficult to assess the
erosive impact of inflation on real civil service compensation.  The second issue, that of (still-
persistent) salary inequalities between men and women, highlights government  failure to
provide the model and the leadership for putting into practice the elementary fairness and
efficiency principle of "equal pay for equal work'.  This should be a continuing priority for
government  and external donors alike.
Wape Structure
In practice, government wage reduction has usually entailed larger proportionate  cuts at
higher salary levels (or salary caps) and, thus, progressively greater salary compression.
(Internationally, average public wages range between 3 and 6 times per capita income, and the
"compression ratio" between the highest and lowest salary ranges from 3:1 to 20:1, with a norm
of about 7:1.) Although the short-term equity considerations are understandable,  the long-term
outcomes of such a policy are the departure  of better employees, difficulty in recruiting
qualified outsiders, and a "deskilled" workforce too poorly paid to resist temptation,  cowed by
pressures from politicians and influential private interests and unable to perform adequately.
Beyond the deterioration  of public goods and services, the result is a worsening economic
climate for the private sector and an increase in transaction costs for the economy as a whole.
In recent years, governments have sought ways to target wage increases to essential
skills or functions.  This may well be the right policy, but a word of caution about "performance
pay" is in order here.  It is intuitively appealing to link bonuses to yearly performance in terms
of specific output measures.  However, the facts show that bonus schemes have been only
marginally effective in improving performance, even in the private sector and especially in the
public sector, where outputs are difficult to quantify.  Performance pay schemes may also
introduce an element of political control over a career civil service. And in multi-ethnic, multi-
religious or clan-based societies, such schemes can be lethal to a delicate social balance. The on-
going New Zealand experiment, which has had some positive results, is thus not applicable to
developing countries.- xiii -
Accountability
Without improvements  in  accountability, downsizing  and more adequate incentives
may result in a small and well-paid but no less inefficient or corrupt civil service.
Accountability, like overstaffing, and wage adequacy, is a relative notion.  The questions that
need to be asked are: accountability for what and to whom.  (For example, greater
"accountability" of civil servants to the political leadership may compromise their integrity and
autonomy.)  Strengthening  civil servants'  accountability to their administrative superiors  (and
to their subordinates  as well) may be necessary, but is rarely sufficient to improve the efficiency
and quality of services, because of the probability of collusion between superiors  and
subordinates.  External accountability is essential for the civil service to become more
responsive to the public; it can be increased through  various means (e.g., user surveys, wearing
of name tags, whistleblower  laws, and public opinion polls).  Of course, increased individual
accountability must be accompanied by appropriate consequences; the size of rewards and
severity of penalties matter less than the certainty, swiftness, transparency,  and fairness with
which they are applied.
Some lessons of experience
Recent efforts at civil service reform have yielded a variety of practical lessons.  First,
international experience shows that there are sixgeneral conditions  for constructive efforts at
reform:
*  Genuine ownership  of the reform is needed-- by the government  as a whole if systemic
issues are to be addressed,  or by a major player in government  if the strategy begins with
reforms in an individual sector or civil service function.  In either case, support  from the
highest political levels is necessary.  Diagnostic and cost-containment measures have less
stringent ownership requirements, but without active local involvement at the appropriate
level, the returns  will be minimal because of lack of follow-up;
*  A coherent long-term vision is mandatory.  Without it, pragmatism becomes ad-hockery,
public support  dissipates, and haphazard  reform actions come to a stop.  The government
must therefore formulate--with appropriate  participation by the public as well as
government  employees themselves--a clear, long-term vision of reform in concrete detail,
with quantitative targets, specific timetables, explicit criteria, and indicators of performance;
*  Selectivity of intervention is important because it is obviously unrealistic to try and reform
the entire system all at once. By focusing interventions in those sectors which are: (i)
important; (ii) amenable to significant improvements in a reasonable period; and (Ili)  likely
to generate role-model effects, selectivity  becomes  a criterion  for optimal  sequencing,  by
strengthening  in turn different institutional linkages (in the context of the long-term vision
mentioned above);
*  Sensitivity-- is obviously necessary to understand  the situation of those affected as well as
the social constraints;- xiv  -
*  Stamina is required by the complex nature and long gestation of civil service reforms.  It
calls for long-term investment of imagination and resources and government willingness to
stay the course;
*  Institutional capacity-- although the need for capacity is evident, not all institutional
capacity need be pre-existent.  It can be improved  as part and parcel of early interventions.
Second, common sense and growing experience point to practical lessons in coping  with
the transition:
*  The government  should test for the system's readiness for genuine reform by undertaking
some specific action, no matter how modest;
*  Diagnostic measures are both an obvious prerequisite to sensible reform, and a non-
confrontational first stage of the process. Examples are functional reviews, civil service
censuses, institutional assessments, pilot surveys of user opinions, and the like.  Structural
civil service reform measures can then build upon the diagnostic measures, provided that
the results have been properly disseminated;
*  Operational approaches to the reform process consistent both with actual experiences and
with the New Institutional Economics include:  (i) the importance of sequencing, by
strengthening  the linkages  among components of the new administrative system which the
government  is trying to put in place, so that each decision is facilitated by the previous
ones; (ii) generating  the spread  of new rules and efficient  organizational  practices  by the deliberate
creation of "efficient nuclei" (as opposed to the enclave approach); (iii) incorporating the
role of hope for individuals within the system-- well-designed  reforms should hold the
promise of potential benefits for all individual civil servants; key to this is that there must
be absolute confidence in the equality of opportunity  of access to the new system; (iv)
internal structural adjustment by giving individual administrative units time, guidance and
positive incentives for reform.
Third, recent practice suggests some transitional measures which can help in the move
away from an underperforming  and underpaid  civil service, but without  massive fiscal
implications or immediate wholesale reform.  It is essential, however, that such measures be a
transition to something, and hence that they be formulated as part of a coherent and concrete
vision of reform and implemented as a step in the sequence leading to that reform.  These
transitional measures are discussed in the text.
Conclusion
This study tries to yield key reliable facts to replace the frequent myths and shibboleths
concerning government  employment and pay in developing countries.  However, our central
message is that the mere facts concerning government employment and wages in any country
say nothing in and of themselves about the need or direction of civil service reform.  Reform
recommendations  must rest on a solid basis of country-specific analysis.- xv-
It is also essential to recognize the benefits and costs of embarking on reforms in this
complex, delicate and important area.  The eventual benefit  of comprehensive reform is a civil
service with the size, skill-mix, motivation, professional ethos and accountability needed to
provide quality public services, reduce transactions  costs for the private sector, implement
economic policy and execute budgets and investment projects. The costs of civil service reform
are the substantial  required resources and policy attention; often, but not invariably, a short-
term political loss; and loss of credibility and sustainability of reform, if this delicate and long-
gestation task is approached  on a quick-fix basis.  Clearly, while the potential development
impact of genuine reform of the civil service is massive,  civil service reform is worth doing
only if it is done well.  Nonetheless, even when circumstances are not ripe for genuine reform,
governments  and development  institutions should keep a "watching brief" on civil service
issues--recalling that the slide of many of today's  failed states began, in part, with the
degradation  of their civil service.- I -
INTRODUCTION:
THE IMPORTANCE  OF A SOUND CIVIL SERVICE
"Sire,  a vast majority  of civfl servants  are  Ill  paid ..The result is that
skilled  and talented  men shun public service. The Government  of Your
Majesty is then forced  to recruit  mediocre  personnel  whose  sole  aim is to
Improve  their  weak  pecuniary  situation...intelligent,  hardworking,
competent,  and motivated Individuals  should  direct Your Empire's civil
service. If treated  as they well deserve,  the  employment  of such  persons
can well  reduce  the  number of civil servants to one-fourth  of its current
size.  "
(Ali Pasha, Grand Vizier to Ottoman Sultan Abdulaziz,  cfrca  1871.
Quoted in Andic and Andic, 1996.)
Civil service issues are not a new concern.  See, for example, the remarkably current
policy advice on public administration  and civil service reform given a century ago to Ottoman
Sultan Abdulaziz by his Grand Vizier Ali Pasha (Box 1). The Sultan disregarded  most of Ali
Pasha's policy prescriptions.  It is sobering to note that just about thirty years later the Empire
was overturned  by the Young Turks.
A good civil service is very important in five areas-governance,  production  of public
goods and services, economic and social policy, budget and project execution, and fiscal
sustainability.
A.  CIVIL  SERVICE  AND  GOVERNANCE
There is strong evidence from all regions that a skilled, motivated, efficient civil service
with a professional ethos is one of the key requirements for good governance  (defined as
efficient management  of public resources, accountability, transparency  and the rule of law).
Experience shows that a good civil service  is necessary  but not sufficient  for good  governance;  a very
bad civil service  is sufficient  but not necessary  for bad  governance. As discussed later, a strong civil
service is one of several reasons why in East.  Asia authoritarianism  has co-existed with excellent
economic performance.  In turn, there are fundamental  links between governance and
development  (see World Bank, 1992).
B.  CIVIL  SERVICE  AND  PUBLIC  GOODS  AND  SERVICES
The production  of public goods is a function of social overhead capital, materials, labor
(i.e., public employees) and the "technology" of their production-i.e.,  the rules of behavior
and accountability that condition quantity and quality of public services. It would be clearly- 2-
nonsensical  for the analysis  of private  production  to exclude  consideration  of labor  inputs,
skills, and  pace  of technological  change.  Similarly,  it makes  no sense  for  the analysis of public
production to exclude consideration of the size and qualihy of the public wvorkforce  and of improvements
in the institutional  rules zwhich  guide its behavior.
Box 1.  Little  New  Under  the Sun
Institutional development:
"Free property, sanction laws that clarify transactions, make them precise and less burdensome.
Then the property owner will have no doubt about his undisputed  rights."
Government administration:
"A program to strengthen the administration must be formulated.  Responsibilities will have to be
well defined and the spheres of action delineated.. .Introduce the indispensable principle of accountability,
without which all progress is retarded  and work inevitably destroyed."
Public financial management:
"Once the budget is determined and approved, the Ministry of Finance should have at its disposal
the monies to be allocated to each service.  No other ministry, nobody...under any pretext should have the
budget altered or the funds diverted from their initially allocated use."
Civil service reform:
"A vast majority of civil servants are ill paid.  The result is that skilled and talented men shun
public service and look for more honorable and remunerative means of livelihood.. If treated as they well
deserve, the employment of such persons can well reduce the number of civil servants to one-fourth of its
current size."
Corporate  governance  of public enterprises:
"Reject  definitely to have factories managed by public employees.  Convert into shares all their
assets, and leave their administration and management to private companies.  The Government would be
represented on their boards, have the right to oversee, and receive dividends."
Excerptsfrom  the Political  Testament  of  Ali Pasha,  Prime  Minister to Ottoman  Sultan  Abdulaziz, circa  1871.
(See  Andic and Andic, 1996.)
C.  CIVIL  SERVICE  AND ECONOMIC  POLICY  REFORM
Economic  policy reforms  can be subdivided  between  "enabling"  reforms  (e.g., lifting  price
controls)  and  "affirmative"  reforms  (e.g., improving  public  expenditure  management).  While
the former  do not require  much  administrative  capacity,  affirmative  reforms  depend  for their
implementation  on competent  and  motivated  government  personnel.  Unfortunately,  in
country  after country  (and  especially  in Africa and  in the transition  economies  of the former-3 -
USSR)  good reform programs  are formulated in all detail but one: who will implement them?
The issue is well-known, but the obvious implication of the need for an efficient and
professional civil service for policy implementation  is rarely translated  into action.  It is easier
to assume that, somehow, good policies will implement themselves.  They never do.  (Besides,
implementation  failures show up sometime after the fact, when those responsible have long
since moved on).
D.  CIVIL  SERVICE  AND  PUBLIC  EXPENDITURE
The execution  of current and investment budgets is a subset of the policy implementation
issue.  It is hard to disregard the dominant influence exercised by the public employees
involved in these areas; yet, project-specific ad hoc remedies (such as payment of bonuses to
attract the best people) are insufficient, messy and often counterproductive  in national
economic terms.  Much of the negative impact of technical assistance in this area, discussed
later, is due to the destructive raiding of donors of the best local personnel, for the sake of
improving performance of their projects at the expense of the system as a whole.
E.  CIVIL  SERVICE  AND  FISCAL  SUSTAINABILITY
The fiscal  burden of the wage bill is considerable in countries with a large government,
and efficient downsizing of government calls for intelligent ways to reduce numbers and/or
wages of public employees.  The "alternative" of closing one's eyes to unsustainable
expenditure levels is invariably far greater costs and absorption down the line.  However, It
matters not onlyhowmuch the wage  bill is reduced,  but how it is reduced,  as we will discuss
extensively in Chapter II (see also World Bank, 1996).- 4 -
I.  GOVERNMENT  EMPLOYMENT  AND PAY:
THE  INTERNATIONAL  FACTS
A.  METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
As Heller and Tait (1983,  p. 35) noted:  "It is surprising and depressing how little
information is readily available on public sector employment  and pay".  Although  this study
attempts to remedy, in part, this state of affairs, the paucity of readily available data is
explained by persisting methodological difficulties.  There is no more hazardous  cross-country
comparison than in the area of "civil service" employment and wages.  The following
methodological problems have been pointed out years ago and are still present.  For a detailed
listing and discussion of methodological problems in the area of government  pay and
employment, the reader is referred to Heller and Tait (1983).
In the first place, statistics of any reliability simply don't exist in many countries.  When
reasonable data are available, international employment comparisons are complicated by the
fact that some countries include teachers and/or  health workers in the civil service, others
don't; some countries include contractual and seasonal (sometimes even daily) workers in
government  employment, others don't;  local government  employment may or may not include
employees paid out of the central government  budget; accordingly, large numbers of persons
may be paid out of the central budget but are not listed among central personnel; paramilitary
personnel (gendarmes,  carabinieri,  etc.) may be included in civilian personnel because of their
public order functions, or in the armed forces because of their military status; employees of
legislative bodies are sometimes included in government  personnel, etc. And, because the basic
social services-education  and health-raise  different policy and practical issues than
government  administration,  it is useful to try and separate out employment of teaching and
health personnel.
International  comparisons are even more problematic for government  wages than they
are for employment.  To begin with, the existence of different benefits-in-kind in different
countries makes it impossible to be sure that differences in monetary compensation adequately
reflect differences in total compensation.  Even when comparisons are limited to monetary
compensation, there are serious problems.  If wage rates are derived from independent  surveys
or from official information on pay scales, it is impossible to treat non-wage allowances and
other monetary benefits uniformly-because  certain sources will include them in the wage
package while others show only the basic salary.  However, budgetary figures on the overall
wage bill paid for through  the central budget are generally reliable, because monetary
allowances are usually captured in the central government budget, and properly classified
under  the wages and salaries item of the budget.  For this reason, measuring the relative
'weight' of the government  wage bill, by defining it as a fraction of GDP or of total expenditure
is both reasonable and reliable.  Compensation rates  are a different matter: dividing the central
government  wage bill by the number of employees listed as working  for the central government
will always tend to inflate average compensation, because significant (and variable) numbers of
employees are paid out of the central budget but work for, and are shown as part of, local
government  entities.  Consequently, it is necessary, country by country and by recourse todifferent sources of information, to adjust the figures on personnel paid from the central
government-in  order to obtain a good approximation of average monetary  compensation.
Assessing wage  "adequacy", or even only ranking countries by relative levels of wages,
presents additional difficulties.  Exchange rate problems make reliable conversion into a single
numeraire difficult. Relating public wages in local currency to other meaningful variables also
in local currency obviates the exchange rate problem, but raises the obvious issue of the
appropriate  denominator.  The only reliable measure of the adequacy of government  wages is
through a statistically-representative  survey of public and private salaries - for comparable
skills, in a given country and at a given time.  Because such surveys are not common (only a
few among the World Bank's private sector assessment studies  contain such information), this
is an impossible standard when large-scale international comparisons are at issue.  In  addition,
the researcher today must contend with the statistical and methodological peculiarities of some
Eastern European countries and of all the former Soviet republics.  The reader is referred to
World Bank (1993),  where these problems have been explained at length.  Accordingly, we
have used in this study three measures of relative government wages:  average central
government  wages relative to wages in manufacturing  (the only statistic available, from the
International Labor Organization, for a large number of countries on a uniform basis); average
wages as a multiple of per capita GDP; and what secondary sources do exist concerning the
ratio of government  to private wages for a few countries in each region.
These difficulties preclude the inclusion of all countries.  We were able to collect and
verify government  employment and wage data for 80-100  countries in the early 1990s,
including all sizable countries in every region (with the exceptions of Brazil and Mexico)-the
largest such survey to-date.  The statistical Appendix  in the companion study contains the
country-by-country  data on labor force, total employment, government  employment and
government wages.  This paper shows the global and regional averages.  The information was
obtained from international surveys, international and national country reports, World Bank,
UN, OECD and IMF reports--and was verified with IMF and World Bank country economists
and in many cases with World Bank Resident Missions.  The text tables and the regional
averages are based only on countries for which reliable data could be found or estimated
concerning: central government  administration  employment; local government  administration
employment; teachers; and health personnel.  In the course of the research, we also came across
information on employment in state-owned enterprises and the military.  This information is
partial, not verified, and not used in the text: it is included in the companion study because of
the low cost of doing so and because it may be useful to the reader for other purposes.  This
paper deals exclusively with civilian government  employment and wages and not at all with
employment in public enterprises or the military-which  raises quite different policy and
empirical questions.
Although  the size of the sample for each region is sufficiently large to make it
representative  of the region as a whole (and accounts for about 90% of the world's population),
the above qualifications make it clear that one should take the regional averages shown below
only as pointers for further analysis.  For example, the extremely low civil servants'
compensation in Eastern Europe and the former USSR  is, in part, a clue to the many in-kind
subsidies and benefits enjoyed by public employees in that region.  In a real sense, it is the
country-by-country  data which matter,  although even these can be quite misleading in the
absence of knowledge of the country and the circumstances.-6 -
B.  THE BASIC PICTURE  IN THE 1990S
1.  Employment
Table 1 and Figure 1 show civilian employment in central and local government
administration,  and teaching and health employment in the various regions-as  percentage of
population. The key findings are as follows:
*  worldwide,  total government  civilian employment currently averages (on an
unweighted  basis for all the countries of the sample) about 4.7% of population.  It is
relatively largest in the developed market economies of the OECD (7.7%  of population),
and second largest in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Europe and Central
Asia - ECA), at 6.9% of population.  Government employment is relatively smallest in
Africa and Asia (respectively, 2.0% and 2.6%  of population).  Latin America and the
Caribbean (LAC),  and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are in between, with
employment accounting for about 3.0% and 3.9% of population  respectively;
*  relative to total employment (Table A-2 of the companion study), the inter-regional
differences are much less marked, because of the significantly lower labor participation
rate and higher unemployment  in developing regions.  The regional rankings  change
somewhat, moreover, with MENA moving up to the highest regional average.
Worldwide, civilian government  employment accounts on average for about 11%  of
total employment, with MENA countries highest at 17.5  %, OECD at 17.2%,  ECA and
LAC at 16.0%  and 8.9%,  respectively.  Africa and Asia are at the low end with 6.7% and
6.3%, respectively;
- the picture changes if teachers and health personnel are excluded.  Because of the large
numbers  of such personnel in ECA (from long-standing Soviet policy), the large overall
employment  in those countries is primarily in teaching and health.  The central
administration  in that region is comparatively not large, and is very small in the former
Soviet republics. Among developing regions, central administration  is largest in the
Middle East and North Africa. Overall, government  administration  in developing
regions, at 1.7%  of population, is less than half the relative size of OECD countries.
Education and health personnel, too, average in developing regions (excluding ECA)
less than half the level of OECD countries;
*  during the 1980s,  local government administration  has grown to almost equal
employment in central administration.  Clearly, civil service reform efforts are badly
incomplete if they do not include consideration of local government  and of teaching and
health personnel;
*  predictably, inter-country and inter-regional variance is smallest for overall government
employment  (with a coefficient of variation of 0.48),  than for either central or local
administration  or for education and health personnel;
*  the inter-country variability of government  employment is the only category for which
there is no difference between industrial and developing countries, suggesting that the
range  of choices on the role of government  does not diminish with economic growth.  If-7 -
there is a tendency toward  "convergence" in public administration,  it is certainly not
borne out by the facts of government employment.
*  the relatively low variance in LAC for total government  employment, combined with
the high variance for central administration,  local administration  and health/education
taken separately, points to the inverse correlation existing in that region between the
size of central government and that of local administration.  (The reasons are
summarized  in the next section);
*  it is also worth noting that the high variance of teaching and health personnel in ECA
(with a 9.0 coefficient of variation) results from a clear difference between Eastern
Europe and the former USSR-with  public employment in social sectors relatively much
lower in Eastern Europe.  To some extent, these sub-regional differences existed before
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. But in part, the difference is due to greater efforts in
Eastern Europe since 1989  to improve education and health service efficiency and, to
that extent, reduce personnel requirements;
*  finally, however obvious, it is essential to point out that differences in government  size,
by themselves,  show broad trends and  "flag" possible concerns, but cannot be allowed to
form the basis for policy recommendations. In-depth country-specific analysis is needed
to justify any recommendation  concerning the size of government  employment.  This
basic point is discussed further in Chapter II.
Table 1. Government  Employment,  early  1990s
(as  percent  of  population)
No.  of  General  Government  Administration  Teaching  &
Countiles  Government  Central  Local  Health
Africa  20  2.0  0.9  0.3  0.8
Asia  11  2.6  0.9  0.7  1.0
Eastern Europe &  former USSR  17  6.9  1.0  0.8  5.1
Latin America & Caribbean  9  3.0  1.2  0.7  1.1
Middle East &  North Africa  8  3.9  1.4  0.9  1.6
OECD  21  7.7  1.8  2.5  3.4
Overall  86  4.7  1.2  1.1  2.4
Source:  Table A-2 of companion  study. All averages  are unweighted.-8 -
Figure  1. Government  employment,  early 1990s
(various recentyears)
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2.  Wages
Table 2 and Figure 2 show the fiscal weight of the central government  wage bill, and
average wages as a multiple of per capita GDP and in relation to private wage levels. The
reader should keep in mind the qualifications made earlier concerning international
comparisons of relative public wages.  Note also that, while the data for the wage bill ratio and
for average wages as multiple of GDP are averages for over 90 countries-and  therefore highly
representative-the  ratios of public to private sector wages come from a handful of countries
for which evidence (primary or secondary) can be found.  The reader is advised to treat all of
these figures-and  especially those in the last column, with a large dose of salt.  Another
indicator of relative public wages exists as well:  the ratio of public wages to average wages in
manufacturing.  This indicator permits much broader country coverage, because manufacturing
wage data are collected and published by the ILO for a large number  of countries on a regular
basis. However, it gives a misleading comparison, as public wages are generally for white-
collar skills, while wages in manufacturing  are generally for lower-paid blue-collar jobs.  The
comparison  (which we have carried out and is included in Table A-3 of the companion study
but is not shown in the text of this paper) is also misleading from a policy viewpoint-for  it
produces the false impression of a relatively well-off civil service.  In conclusion, therefore,
while every measure of relative wage adequacy is imperfect to some degree  (except in the few
cases where a private pay comparability survey exists-cases  which, however, cannot be taken
as fully representative  of other countries), they all produce consistent results, summarized
below:
*  for the entire sample of about 90 countries, the central government wage bill absorbs
about 5.4% of GDP. With wage rates for local government roughly  estimated from
information for a few countries at about three-fourths of central government wages, and
based on the employment information shown in Table 1, total civilian government
salaries can be estimated to absorb about 8% of GDP as a worldwide  average;
*  the heaviest fiscal weight of the central government  wage bill is in the Middle East and
North Africa (9.8%  of GDP), followed by Africa at 6.7% of GDP. Asia, the OECD-9  -
countries and Latin America are all  between 4.5% and 5% of GDP, and the lowest
percentage of GDP is accounted for by the central government wage bill in Eastern
Europe and former USSR;
*  when measured as a multiple of per capita GDP, central government  wages appear
higher in Africa than in any other region, apparently contrary to widespread  evidence
concerning deterioration  of public wages in Africa. This finding, however, is largely
due to the lower participation rate in African countries (see Table A-I of the companion
study) and the higher (although unquantifiable) degree of underestimation  of informal
production  and thus of GDP per capita.  Furthermore, the African average is influenced
by comparatively high salaries in franc-zone countries,  which are 7-11  times per capita
GDP. It is, thus, entirely possible that government wages may still be higher than
needed to attract and retain qualified government personnel in franc-zone countries.  In
most of the rest of Africa, instead, the widespread  consensus about severe wage
inadequacy is most probably right;
*  conversely, the relatively low multiplier for OECD countries is related to the higher
participation rate as well as the much higher GDP and smaller skill differentials
between public employees and the rest of the working population.  As noted earlier, the
low figure for ECA is In part explained by the existence of a variety of benefits-in-kind
which are not captured in the available data.  But the reality of government  wage
inadequacy in the region (especially the former Soviet Union) is undeniable;
the above findings are supported  by data for 16 countries, from a variety of sources,
concerning the relationship of public to private wages for comparable skill-mixes.
Although the data are fragmentary and for a small sample, the picture conforms
roughly with the findings from the other indicators.  Generally, government
employment carries a "discount" of 10-20%-which  is not unreasonable  considering the
greater job security.  The lowest relative public wages are found in ECA; in this case, the
figure is less misleading than the simple multiple of per capita GDP, because "private"
employees in the region also receive a variety of in-kind benefits. The highest
government  wages are found in the Middle East and North Africa, about one-third
higher than comparable private compensation;
*  at the risk of sounding pedantic, we must conclude this section with the same caveat as
for employment:  wage policy recommendations  cannot be based on such aggregate
evidence as presented here.  However,  the regional evidence does give some context to
individual country data, and provides a basis for assessing broad trends over time-to
which we now turn.- 10  -
Table  2.  Central Government  Wages,  early 1990s
Average  Central
Central  Government  Government  Wage  as  Ratio of  Public to
No. of  Wages  and Salaries  as  Multiple of  per capita  Private sector
countries  % of GDP  GDP  wages
Africa  21  6.7  5.7  1.0
Asia  14  4.7  3.0  0.8
ECA  21  3.7  1.3  0.7
LAC  12  4.9  2.5  0.9
MENA  8  9.8  3.4  1.3
OECD  16  4.5  1.6  0.9
Overall  92  5.4  3.0  0.8
Source: Table  A-3 of the companion  study  for the first  two columns;  various  reports  and  World  Bank
project  documents,  for aboutl6  countries,  for  the ratio  of public  and  private  wages.
Figure 2.  Central  Government  Wages,  early 1990s
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C.  CHANGES  OVER  THE  LAST  DECADE
In 1983,  Peter Heller and Alan Tait produced an international comparison of
government  employment and wages, covering a sample of about 45-50 countries.  Table 3 and
Figure 3 compare some of their findings with our data for the same countries (hence  different
from the data for our larger  sample). Furthermore, for comparability, it is necessary to limit the
sample to central government employment and wages only. Nevertheless, the trends  are clear.
The following salient points emerge:
*  a large contraction in both central government  employment  (relative to population)  and
the relative wage bill is evident in all regions, with the relative size of central
government  shrinking by about forty percent when measured  by employment and one-
third when measured  by the wage bill;
*  central government  employment decreased in relative terms across the board during the
1980s,  by about one-third for OECD, Africa and LAC and whopping  sixty percent for
Asia. The reduction was only in part offset by growth in local government.  In LAC, the
reduction in central personnel is largely explained by a vast shift from central to local
government.  In Africa, the reduction in Central Government employment was
reinforced by a probable shrinkage in local government as well;
relative central government wages fell in the 1980s  by about 14%  when measured  as a
multiple of per capita GDP. The decline was slight in OECD countries and substantial
in Africa, with government salaries holding their own in LAC, and apparently
increasing in Asia.  (The Asia result, however, is heavily affected by India which after
1986 increased the salaries of its civil servants.  Average wages as multiple of per capita
GDP appear steady in Asia, if India is removed from the sample.)  Thus, it is
developments  in Africa which are largely responsible for the decline in relative
government  wage in the overall sample.  Moreover, the decline in African wages
relative to GDP occurred in a decade of severe economic contraction, while the rest of
the world was experiencing some degree of economic growth.  Consequently, while the
economic welfare of the average civil servant improved slightly worldwide,  and
significantly in Asia, it declined sharply in Africa;
*  because of the concomitant contraction in central government employment,  the central
government wage bill as proportion of GDP dropped  in Africa on both accounts.  To this
must be added the reduction in the central government  wage bill in both Asia and Latin
America (in Latin America because of the already-noted  move to decentralization).  As a
result, for the developing country sample, the decline in the relative weight of the
central government  wage bill in the 1980s  was 28%.- 12 -
Table 3. Government Employment and Wages,
early 1980s and early 1990s
Central  Government
Central  Government  as  Central  Government  wage  average  wages  as multiple
percent  ofpopulation  bill  as  percent  of  GDP  ofper capita  GDP
arly 1980s  l  198  Early 1990s  Early 1980s  Early 1990s  Eard 1980s  Early  1990s
Afrinca  2 6  1.1  10.0  7.9  261  4.38
Latin America  2.4  1.5  7.3  4.7  2.7  2.3
Developingl
country sample  2.2  1.2  8.5  6.1  l  4.7  4.1
OECD  countries  2.9  1.9  5.5  4.4  1.7  1.6
Total  sample  2.5  1.5  7.3  5.4  3.7  3.2
Sourar:  For  early  1980s  Heller  and  Tait.  1983;  for  early  1990-s  Annex  A-3,  Annex  A-4  of companion  study.
3 Note that the data for the early 1990's  are limited to the Heller and Tait sample.They  are therefore  different  from those for
the  larger  sample in this study. N represents  the number of countries  in the sample.- 13 -
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D.  THE DETERMINANTS  OF GOVERNMENT  EMPLOYMENT
According to the so-called "Wagner law", the public sector tends to expand faster than
the economy--in other words, growth is positively correlated with the public expenditure  share
of GDP. The standard  explanations are the need for countervailing the power of large
industries, the costs of regulating a more and more complex economy, and the assumption that
many public goods are socially "superior goods".  Organizational theory, moreover, argues for
an inherent tendency of all organizations to expand; because of lower contestability for state
activities, this is more likely to translate into actual expansion of state organizations.
There is some evidence (e.g. Lindauer,  1981,  Martin, 1982,  Diamond, 1977  and Bird,
1971),  including that presented in this paper, in favor of this proposition.  In the simplest
formulation, it is surely not accidental that government  employment in OECD countries is
twice as high, relative to population,  as in the rest of the world  (see Table 1). However, the size
of the public sector is a function of several factors other than levels of development.  As only
the most dramatic such factor, recall the far-reaching changes wrought--or  made possible--by
the on-going revolution  in information technology.
Thus, Heller and Tait (1983)  found that, in addition to the positive relationship between
GDP per capita and government  employment, employment was higher in centrally planned
economies (obviously to be expected)  and the share of central government  to total government
employment decreased at higher income levels. And Kraay and Van Rijckeghem (1995) noted
a positive association of government  employment with degree of urbanization,  education
levels, and--predictably--resources  available to the government
We have estimated here the influence on government  employment of the following
variables:  (i) per capita income, (ii) government wages relative to per capita income; (iii) the
fiscal deficit relative to GDP; and (iv) population.  First, we estimated this relationship for the
absolute number of employees.  The results (not shown here) confirm that the influence of
population  on government employment swamps that of any other variable.  To go beyond this
rather obvious finding, we then used as the dependent variable employment as percentage of
population.
The companion study shows, globally and for each region, and for central government
administration,  local government  administration,  and public employment in the social sectors,
the results of estimating the following equation:
E = f (C, GDP, WAG, DEF, POP). where
E = government  employment as percent of population;
GDP = per capita GDP in US dollars;
WAG = average central government wage as percent of per capita GDP (both in local
currency);
DEF = central government  fiscal deficit as percent of GDP (both in local currency); and
POP = population  in thousands.- 15 -
The suffixes in the companion study denote the following: CG, LG, SS are respectively,
employment as percentage of population  in central government,  local government,  and
education and health, and GG is general government,  i.e., the total of the above.  ES denotes the
entire sample; DEV denotes non-OECD countries, and OECD, AFR, AS, ECA, LAC and MENA
the various regions.  (Thus, for example, GGLAC means total civilian government  employment
as percent of population  in the Latin American sample of countries.)
The general expectation would be as follows.  If Wagner's Law is valid--in any of its
meanings--government  employment should be positively associated with per capita income.
The association between public employment and public expenditure is well  established.
Concerning wages, one would expect to find lower relative wages in countries with relatively
higher government  employment.  Next, if the workforce (rather than the wage level) is the
main determinant  of the wage bill, higher levels of relative central government  employment
should be associated with higher fiscal deficits. Finally, a negative link between population
and administrative employment would confirm other evidence of scale economies in the
production  of administrative services while a negative link with public employment in
education and health  could suggest the existence of more developed private provision of social
services.
Because reliable data on fiscal deficits are not available for all countries, the equation is
estimated for 57 countries out of our total sample of 105. This is still large enough to provide a
sufficient number of degrees of freedom, both globally and for each region (except ECA; for
ECA, therefore, the regressions shown in the companion study exclude the deficit variable).
Furthermore, the findings (not shown here) from re-estimating all equations in the companion
study without the deficit variable are very similar to those discussed below.  In the larger
equation applied to the smaller sample, the R-squareds are greater and the individual
regression coefficients about the same. Thus, the picture described below can be considered
valid for a sample of well over half of the world's  countries in the early 1990s.
1.  The Global Picture
The regression results are generally satisfactory, with the following salient points:
*  globally, all R-squareds are significant at least at the 0.95 level. For total
government  employment, central government,  local government  and the social
sectors, respectively, the adjusted R-squareds are 0.52, 0.36, 0.44 and 0.36;
*  the closest association (positive) of government employment is with per capita
income.  When added to the results of earlier studies  (e.g. Lindauer,  1981;  Heller
and Tait, 1983;  Graag and Van Rijckeghem, 1995),  this finding for a much larger
sample removes all reasonable doubt about the validity of "Wagner's Law".
However, this is not true in the OECD countries (see below).  Also, because the
'law' has very different possible meanings, the actual dynamics of the relationship
between growth and government require in-depth  country-specific analysis.  (As
stressed later, a very small civil service can still be 'overstaffed'  if inefficient or- 16 -
corrupt; and a case can be made for expanding even a large government workforce
if it is insufficient to fulfill deliberate social choices);
*  the next closest association (negative) is between central government  employment
and relative wages, confirming the standard  expectation.  (That there is no
significant relationship between wages and local government is easily explained by
our being obliged to use central government  wages as a proxy);
*  although inclusion of the fiscal deficit variable generally adds to the explanatory
power of the overall equation, the deficit coefficients themselves are not significant-
-except in Africa, where the correlation between central government  and the deficit
is even closer than between employment and low relative wages.  Generally,
whatever  influence government  employment has on the deficit seems to be largely
offset by the concomitant lower wages.  Certainly, the availability of financing
(stressed by Kraay and Van Rijckeghem, 1995)  appears to be far more important
than the level of the deficit per se;
•  finally, although the coefficient for population  generally carries the negative sign
expected from the possibility of administrative scale economies, the relationship is
weak and inconclusive--except for central government  in the OECD countries and
in Latin America.  This suggests that administrative scale economies come into play
only beyond a rather large scale and for the more developed  central
administrations.
2.  The Regional Picture
The global findings are almost entirely due to the influence of Africa and LAC.
Although  the overall R-squareds are comparable for both the OECD and the non-OECD group,
the only marginally significant associations in the OECD group are between central
government  and population  (negative), and between local government  and the fiscal deficit.
The probable meaning of the association has been noted earlier.  The second association,
between a higher central deficit and greater local employment, is anything  but obvious.  One
possible explanation is that, in OECD countries, decentralization has meant that revenue has
been transferred  to local entities more than in proportion  to the devolution  of expenditure
responsibilities.  In developing countries, instead, a lower central deficit is associated with
higher local government  employment, suggesting a downloading  of fiscal problems from the
center to local  governments.  Both explanations, of course, are tentative and much more
analysis would  be needed.
What is more intriguing is the absence of any association, in the OECD group, between
relative wages and government  employment.  Among the possible explanations are a much
higher elasticity of demand for government employees in advanced  countries, or a greater
weight of the psychic income derived from public service--given that in countries with high per
capita income and high participation rates, a salary equal to a relatively low multiple of per
capita income permits a two-earner family to live reasonably well.- 17 -
The lack of association in the OECD group between government  employment and per
capita income is also of considerable interest--and is in contrast with the findings for earlier
times(e.g., Martin, 1982). This means either that the Wagner tendency has been counteracted by
deliberate policies in the 1980s,  or that "Wagner's Law' itself becomes inoperative  beyond a
certain level of development--or  both.
With adjusted R-squareds of up to 0.85 (for central government  in Africa), the regression
results are significant for Africa and LAC. For MENA, the lack of significance is partly
explained by the small sample.  For ECA, its is easily explained by the special data difficulties
and by the magnitude  and fluidity of the economic and administrative transformation.  For
Asia, instead, it would  appear that country-specific characteristics (other than income, wages,
deficit and population)  influence government employment.  However, more detailed research
is needed before any such firm conclusion.  It is possible, for example, that the lack of
significant results in both regions stems from intra-regional difference--between South Asia and
East Asia, and between CEE and the former USSR (the very different nature of civil service
problems in these sub-regions is discussed in the next section).  It is impossible, however, to test
for these differences, as the degrees of freedom would be too few.
Other main findings are:
*  the results are most striking in Africa,  where the equation has the largest
explanatory values and, for central government  employment, every co-efficient is of
the expected sign and highly significant (except for population).  The evidence is
now conclusive that the proportion of population  employed by African central
governments  is higher where per capita income and the fiscal deficit are higher, and
wages relatively lower.  Local government employment  is significantly correlated
only with per capita income, and employment in public teaching and health only
with wages;
*  the correlation in Latin America  between central government  and wages is almost as
close as in Africa. As noted earlier, this region also shows the closest negative
association between central government  employment and population--again,
strongly, suggesting  the presence of administrative scale economies.  However,
because all the smaller countries are concentrated in the Caribbean, the small
population-large  administration  connection could also be explained by economic or
cultural differences (other than just population  size). Interestingly, too, while there
is no association between per capita income and central government
administration,  employment in local government  is strongly correlated with the
country's  income level. This finding supports  other evidence concerning the
importance and pace of decentralization in Latin America;
*  finally, in the Middle  East and North Africa, although the equation as a whole
appears to be significant for all levels of government, and the individual  co-
efficients are generally of the expected sign, the statistical significance is weak for
all coefficients.- 18-
3.  A Concluding  word
There is no longer a reasonable doubt that in developing  countries comparatively high
central government  employment is associated with comparatively high per capita income and
lower relative wages.  But, of course, statistical associations say nothing about causality or its
direction.  Furthermore, the Wagner tendency is just that--a tendency--which, as the data for
the OECD suggest, can be counteracted by deliberate policy.  Concerning wages and
employment, it would  be especially risky to infer from cross-sectional data anything concerning
the likelihood that wages would rise (or fall) if employment were reduced  (or increased) in any
particular country.  All one can say is the obvious, albeit powerful, statement that retrenchment
offers the possibility of improving employee compensation, while employment  expansion
carries a strong risk of eroding wages.
E.  DIFFERENT  REGIONS,  DIFFERENT  PROBLEMS
The key features and challenges of civil service reform in the various developing regions
are summarized  below.  As in the case of the statistical comparisons, these are of necessity very
broad generalizations.  Several countries in each region have had experiences entirely different
from those sketched out below.  Continental generalizations can be badly misleading for
particular countries, and the following generalizations should be promptly  discarded as soon as
they appear in conflict with country-specific realities. Nevertheless, they have some utility in
providing a broad regional context.
1.  Africa
It is in Africa where, with few exceptions (i.e.,  Botswana), the degradation of the civil
service has been most severe.  There are differences, for example in franc-zone countries
where, by and large, the civil service is much better paid (with wages averaging up to ten times
per capita GDP, compared to a continental average of 5.5 times per capita GDP). But generally,
government  employment in sub-Saharan Africa is at the lowest size and efficiency level of any
developing region.  While further downsizing remains in order in some countries, the clear
need in most African countries is for a thorough  overhaul of the system to make it produce
good quality public services and act to facilitate private activity.  Disappointingly,  with some
promising exceptions (e.g., Uganda  - see Box 2), civil service reform in Africa has been
generally limited to tinkering  around the edges and to paper reforms.  Despite growing interest
and assistance by international organizations, meaningful administrative  and civil service
reform has yet to touch most of the continent.  Cost-containment has been the entire story.- 19 -
Box 2.  Uganda: Rebuilding  a Broken-Down  Civil  Service
At independence in 1962,  Uganda had one of the strongest and most promising economies in
Sub-Saharan Africa. From about 1970,  two decades of political turmoil and gross economic
mismanagement radically changed the situation.  Oppressive and unrepresentative regimes, inadequate
salaries and the consequent migration of educated and skilled work force, lack of basic equipment and
supplies, destruction of buildings and inability of the government to restore discipline led to the
breakdown of one of the most effective public administrations in Eastern Africa.
Capacity rebuilding efforts in Uganda commenced after the National Resistance Movement
(NRM) Government assumed power in January 1986. Recognizing the lack of skilled staff from
insufficient incentives, the Govermment began an aggressive effort to increase remuneration in the Civil
Service. Because of the budget constraint, increasing salaries also meant reducing the total complement of
staff. The initial attempts at reform focused on reducing the numbers of part-time employees and
streamlining the number, roles and functions of ministries. In October 1990,  a policy framework for a
comprehensive civil service reform was presented by the Public Service Review and Reorganization
Commission (PSRRC). Its implementation has resulted in significant real increases in salaries; a reduction
in the number of ministries from 38 in 1989 to 21 currently; and the rationalization of ministerial
mandates and structures to remove duplications and overlaps.  In particular, remarkable progress has
been achieved in reducing staff from 320,000  in 1989  to around 148,000  currently.  This retrenchment was
made easier by the extremely low wages prevailing at the time, and permitted a substantial improvement
in wages for remaining employees. In addition, there has been significant decentralization of central
government responsibilities for service delivery to the districts.
Despite these achievements, major  issues remain to be addressed, with aid from the WoTld  Bank
and other donors: improving central personnel management systenms; c  of personnel;
improving transparency and efficiency of personnel adiministration and estblishing  imtproved personnel
regulations.  A new salary structure is to be put in place, and a performance recognition system is being
developed, as well as a Code of Conduct for civil servants, as a move towards greate  accountability. For
the same reason, it is also intended to strengthen the Inspection Department of the Ministry of Public
Service and introduce results-oriented management, focusing civil servants on service delivery through
the achievement of definite objectives  witin  specified time targets.- 20 -
Box 3.  Burkina  Faso:  Ratcheting  to Higher  Wages
Burkina:Faso is an exception to the general reality of poorly paid African civil servants.  The
average civil1service  wage in Burkina Faso was 12 times per capita income in 1994,  compared with the
Africaniaverage of five times per  Icapita income.
Not coincid  tlly,  the size6of  the civil service in Burkina Faso is relatively modest.  Nevertheless,
between 1980 and 1990,  about 55% of Burkina Faso's domestic expenditures and more than 60% of its tax
revenues were absorbedbyk government wage expenditures.  ThEe  compensation structure includes the
following:
*  An automatic promotion system has resulted in the number of professionals in the civil service
exceed  ing  the number of support-level staff by about 80%. This has contributed, over time,  to
increases in the average rate of civil service remuneration. Lower-level staff can also be promoted
fairly easily into the professional grades by passing an internalvexamination. Civil servants are also
relatively young, with almost two-thirds aged between 21 and 40. Employees with more than 20
years of service account  0for 'less  than 10% of total staff, while those with less than 10 years account for
almost  twothirds;
*  Given the age and grade structure of staff, the effectof the automatic promotion has been to increase
0  the average civil service salary by about  55% per year, substantilly  greater than thegrowth  rate of per
capita national income. The larger portion of the annual 5% increase has been due to the automatic
advancement6process. The  dremainderreflects  the growing proportion  ofemployees in the higher
grades (traceable to the high percentage of university graduates  among new recruits each year);
l  A recent survey has also found that salaries were beig  paid to a nmxber of ghost workers.
A number of measures have been taken:since 1991  to contain  wages, andi  there have been efforts
to restructure the civil service towards hig  priority social services&  While these efforts  are  beginning to
l  bea~r  ifruit,  wage outly  in iBurl'ina  Fasof  cotinu  toremi  hig  relatie  to both tSotalependituresf an
government reVenue,  while  Burina  Faso's social  indicators remain weak.
A hopeful  recent  development  is the variety  of self-help  community  initiatives  spawned
by the degradation  of the official civil service,  particularly  in elementary  education,  basic health
care and  local services  such  as waste  disposal.  (As noted  earlier,  official local government
employment  is very  small  in Africa.)  While  these  initiatives  cannot  be a full substitute  for a
well-functioning  government  administration,  as pointed  out by  Rogerio  Pinto,  they  are at least
a partial  exit from  the current  morass,  and  offer 'models'  from which  efforts  at improving  the
official civil service  can benefit.  In this  respect,  the strategic question is whether  greater
interaction  between  central  government  and  local self-help  initiatives  would  improve  public
service  delivery  and  access,  or merely  result  in suffocating  the local activities  themselves.  The
operational question is the linkage  between  local self-help  and  the activities  of foreign  and  local
NGOs;  in this context,  the emerging  partnership  between  international  donor  organizations
(including  the World  Bank) and  the NGO  community,  albeit  not without  its growing  pains,  can
be very  constructive.
Another  recent  development  is the launching  of "Sector  Investment  Programs"  in many
African  countries.  To the extent  that  these  do not substitute  for weaknesses  of overall
investment  programming,  and  are explicitly  in the context  of a coherent  vision  for civil service- 21 -
reform as a whole, they may help  advance the reform process.  If instead they are conceived
and implemented as isolated sectoral exercises, they carry the serious risk of producing partial
results, inconsistent with one another, and to that extent compromise both overall investment
efficiency and the chances for systemic civil service reform.
The main constraint  to genuine improvements in the civil service in Africa is that they
are sure to be fiscally expensive, requiring in most countries an increase in real wages more
than proportional  to whatever retrenchment is still possible, and vast investments in personnel
management, retraining and accountability systems. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine how
civil service reform in most African countries can be meaningful without substantial
improvements in overall governance  - transparency, accountability and the rule of law.  And,
beyond the inefficiency and interference of civilian employees, there lie the even harder
problems of high military expenditures and dysfunctional behavior of military personnel;  in
too many countries it is a sad reality that the African citizen's greatest threat comes from the
African soldier. Thus, civil service  reform  - structurally  complex,  politically  problematic,  fiscally
expensive  - is as daunting in Africa  as it is essential.
Figure 4 shows relative central government wages and total government employment as
percent of population for each of the 16 African countries in our sample.  As noted earlier, there
is a reasonably good inverse correlation between wages and central government employment
in this region. In addition, the chart is a convenient way to show where each country stands,
relative to the other countries of the region, concerning government employment and wage
level.
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2.  Asia
The distinction often made between East Asia and South Asia is in reality a distinction
between the newly-industrialized  countries and the developing countries of Asia. In the
newly-industrialized  countries of East Asia, the civil service is generally seen as efficient,
motivated and professional.  Indeed, while governance problems have been directly- 22 -
responsible for economic decline in Africa, many East Asian countries have experienced
remarkable growth (with some equity) under authoritarian  regimes.  It can be argued that the
link between authoritarianism  and economic decline, so evident in Africa, has been inoperative
in Asian countries largely because of their strong civil service.  Greater responsiveness  and
openness can legitimately be demanded  of public administrations  in some East Asian countries;
the calling to account of the two former Presidents  of South Korea is a recent case in point.
Clearly, however, civil service systems in most East Asian countries cannot be considered a
problem: they are, rather, an important part of the solution to these countries' other problems.
Recently, Joseph Stiglitz (Stiglitz, 1996)  offered several convincing explanations of rapid growth
in East Asia (beyond the customary empiricism of higher saving and investment rates), chiefly,
a more equitable income distribution, emphasis on education and (directly relevant to our
topic) cooperative relations between the government  and the private sector. Stiglitz is certainly
right both in his explanations and in his overall conclusion that the remarkable East Asian
performance was due to a combination of ingredients, and not to any single factor.  Yet, he
misses one of the key ingredients:  an efficient and competent civil service, with the incentives
and professional ethos needed for managing both the government  itself and its cooperative
relationship with business.
Jayati Datta-Mitra and Migara de Silva have argued (personal communication) that--at
least in Korea--it was from private pressure for better service delivery that the public
administration  became more efficient, and not the other way around.  Even if this was the case
(the Singapore experience is surely different), the fact remains that the rapid growth path could
not have been sustainable in the absence of a robust and efficient civil service, whether or not
such civil service was present at the very beginning of the path.
The situation is markedly different in South Asia, where civil service reform must rank
as a top priority.  The core problem is different than in Africa. While in Africa the key problem
is a demotivated  and de-skilled civil service, in many South Asian countries a highly competent
and efficient civil service has coexisted with administrative inefficiency and corruption.  The
main issue here is probably over-regulation, which is both a cause and an effect of bloated
public employment and the single surest route to corruption.  Consequently, regulatory
simplification and the resulting contraction of public employment, although complex and
politically difficult, could raise economic efficiency, reduce corruption and  - unlike in Africa
-also  produce substantial  fiscal savings at the same time.
Pervasive political interference is a second major impediment  to administrative
efficiency in many countries of the region.  India is a major case in point (see Box 4). Not only
is India's administrative  red tape legendary, but the autonomy of its highly qualified civil
servants is severely circumscribed in practice (despite the statutory protection from interference
in their individual actions), by frequent transfers and other arrangements.
Figure 5 shows relative central government wages and employment  as percent  of
population  for the 12 Asian countries of our samples.  (No association between the two
variables is visible for this region.  Nevertheless, the chart is an economical way to summarize
the information for each country relative to its region).- 23 -
Box 4.  India:  An Elite  Civil  Service  Gasping  In The  Political  Winds
The Indian  Administrative  Service (IAS), successor  to the Indian  Civil Service  (ICS), the legendary  "steel
frame"  of the British  Raj, is today  battling  onslaughts  to its relevance.
The strengths  of the Service lie in its extraordinary  pool of skills and  talents,  its field experience,  its
extensive  networking,  its appreciation  and overview  of the functioning  of government  at the cutting  edge,  its
understanding  of delivery  systems  for development,  awareness  of the formal  and  informal  socio-economic  networks
in the field,  its "can deliver"  attitude,  its role in national  integration,  its ready  adaptability  to new and  unfamiliar
situations  and  tasks,  and its social orientation,  bolstered  by intense  competition  among  the officers.
Among  its weaknesses  are the rancor  it has generated  among  other services  at Central  and State levels;  the
increasing  rarity  of impartial  policy  advice;  political  and  caste alignments;  incompetence  and corruption  going
unpunished,  and  initiative  and  integrity  unrewarded;  frequent  transfers  and the "transfer  industry"  in some States
(where the average  tenure  of field officers  may  be as low as 8 months);  and  the demoralizing  impact  of judicial
activism,  especially  "stay  orders"  which  stymie  development  projects,  and  contempt  cases against  individual
officers.
While the tiny ICS (never  more  than  500 at its peak)  was an elite service  entrusted  with the administration
of the British  Empire  in India,  the IAS has a much wider  and  more  challenging  role as an agent  of change.  The lAS
today  is still an elite, numbering  about  3,500, of whom  one-third  are promoted  from  State civil services and  the rest
recruited  centrally  through  a rigorous  competitive  examination  process  designed  to select about  70 recruits  annually
from  about  200,000 applicants.  The recruitment  process  is perhaps  one of the toughest  and  most objective  in the
world,  and  the quality  of recruits  excellent,  coming  from across  the social and  educational  spectrum  (though  critics
have questioned  the social efficacy of a system  which  encourages  skilled  surgeons,  nuclear  scientists  and  engineers
to enter  what  is, after  all, the largest  development  bureaucracy  in the world).
Put through  a rigorous  2-year training  process  encompassing  field  training  with all departments  of the
government,  attachments  with the Central  and State legislatures,  as well  as with  the judiciary,  the armed  forces and
industries,  officers are allocated  to different  States where  they  will spend  a large part  of their career.  They have  to
learn  the regional  language  and the laws  of the allocated  State.  After typically  serving  as field officers  in
successively  higher  capacities  for about  7-10 years,  culminating  with  the post of District Officer  (a.k.a. District
Magistrate/Collector/Deputy  Commissioner),  officers generally  serve alternately  with  the Center  and the State, their
intimate  knowledge  of field  conditions  in the State enabling  them  to render  expert  policy  advice  to the State and
Central  governments  in successively  senior  positions.  It is doubtful  if any other  service  in the world  exposes  such
young  professionals  (typically  between  26 and 40 years  of age) to such  a variety  of challenges  and decision-making
opportunities.  For instance,  as District  Magistrates  (a district  is part  of a State and  may  typically  have a population
of two to three million  and sometimes  as much  as seven  to eight  rmillion), they  are, in the last resort,  responsible  for
everything  in their  jurisdiction,  from  conduct  of elections  to urban  and  rural  development,  public  health,  school
education,  industrial  promotion,  calamity  administration,  law and  order,  protocol,  prosecutorial  and  police
supervision,  land  reforms,  settlement  of industrial  disputes,  supervision  and  control  of the executive  magistracy,  jails
and welfare,  Treasury  management,  issuing  of arms  licenses  and so on.
In the States,  almost  all Secretaries  to Government  (i.e., the permanent  civil service  heads  of department)  are
from the IAS.  At the Center,  about 70% of Secretaries  are from  the IAS. Other  Services  are naturally  bitter  about  this
state  of affairs and complain  that  "Nothing  grows  in the shade  of the Banyan  tree".  Over-recruitment  to the IAS and
other  services  in the 1970s and  1980s resulted  in massive  cadre  congestion,  unnecessary  creation  of posts  to
accommodate  officers,  and  frustration  among  officers,  compounded  by a fall in living standards,  both  relative  to the
private  sector and  in real  terms.  Now,  intake  is sharply  reduced,  and  almost  50% of seats  are reserved  for Scheduled
Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes  and Other  Backward  Classes  (SC/ST/OBC).  IAS officers, after  retirement,  often  become
ambassadors  or Governors,  or enter  politics  and  become influential  legislators  or Ministers.
Notwithstanding  such  vicissitudes,  the IAS today  is at the leading  edge  of change  in the country,  ushering
in reforms  in different  sectors.  The questions  are:  Does  it have  the vision  to reform  itself into a more  efficient,  more
transparent  and  leaner  agent  of change?  Will it be given the political  and  administrative  space to do so?- 24 -
Figure 5.  Relative Wages and Government  Employment, Asia
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3.  Eastern  Europe and the former USSR
As noted earlier, a distinction must be made between Eastern European countries and
the Baltics, and the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent  States (CIS). The challenge
of economic transformation  -and  hence a fundamental reorientation of administration
structures-is  common to all transitional economies of Europe and Central Asia.  But the CIS
countries (except Russia) face the gigantic - and historically unique - double  challenge of
economic transformation and state-building:  they have not had a central government in living
memory nor, in fact, did they constitute for centuries (most never) an independent  political
entity within their present boundaries.  It is not surprising, therefore, that administrative
improvements have been more noticeable in Eastern Europe - especially in countries such as
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.  (Indeed, the Czech Republic now offers many
examples of administrative "best practice". In particular, the sustainability of its economic
reforms and of its administrative institutions and structures owes much to the early recognition
(largely to be credited to President Vaclav Havel) of the need to clarify and respect property
rights and not trample on them for the sake of quick but ephemeral reform "successes".)
Certainly, the job of reorienting the state toward a role of "steering, not rowing", is far from
complete in Eastem Europe and progress is much less significant in Southeastern Europe.  But
in most countries progress has been made and the process of administrative reform is under
way.- 25 -
Not so in the CIS, where  the process  of reorienting  the state toward  the  role of "steering,
not rowing"  is still at an early  stage,  low state capability  is a serious  and  mounting  obstacle  to
progress  on  economic  and  social areas,  and  a host of severe problems  has  emerged  from  general
lack of accountability  and  transparency.  A first fundamental  problem  is the weak
accountability  of the executive  to the legislature.  In the very  early  1990s, parliaments  in most of
the new countries  were  the only repository  of whatever  political  legitimacy  existed  after the
collapse  of the USSR.  There  were even  instances  of excessive  interference  by the legislature  into
routine  executive  functions  (which  remains  a problem  in Ukraine).  However,  political  changes
since  then  have  produced  a situation  in most countries  characterized  by a dominant  executive
and  weak  legislative  oversight.  The extremely  complex,  opaque  and  fragmented  organization
of government,  too, needs  substantial  simplification  and  consolidation.  And  the weaknesses
and  inefficiency  of the judicial  systems  compound  severely  the problems  from lack of public
administration  capacity.
Except for improving  somewhat  civil service  autonomy,  genuine  administrative  reform
in most  of the FSU is conspicuous  for its absence.  The central  government  workforce  is
typically  very  small, without  the skills needed  for administration  in a non-command  economy
(albeit highly  educated  and  technically  knowledgeable),  unaccustomed  to personal  initiative,
deprived  of basic supplies  and  resources  and  very  badly  paid.  (Georgia  is an extreme
example  -see  Box 5.)
Box 5.  Extreme Government  Wage Inadequacy  in Georgia
Among the more extreme illustrations of inadequate government wages is the former Soviet
republic of Georgia. A government accountant there receives monthly compensation of less than six
million 'coupons' (equivalent to about five dollars). The same accountant working in a state enterprise
would receive, including bonuses and in-kind supplements, about 60 million coupons (about $50). And if
the accountant worked in a privatized enterprise, the compensation package would be close to 100 million
per month (70 million in salary and another 30 million in allowances), almost twenty times the salary for
the same skill in government employment, and sufficient for a very modest living.
With subsistence income estimated in Georgia at about $60 per month for a family of four, it is
evident that government employees must find alternative sources of income if they are to survive.  With
both parents working, average government jobs would give the family a monthly total salary barely
sufficient to subsist for one week.  The total salary would be below family subsistence level even if each
parent received the basic salary of the Prime Minister.
The intractability of the problem, in Georgia, is shown by the fact that, in order to raise
government salaries to bare subsistence (not even competitive) levels, the fiscal constraint would require
cutting the civilian government workforce from over 400,000  to about 12,000  employees. This situation is
extreme even by FSU standards -and  is largely associated with the fact that the collapse of domestic
revenues in Georgia has been even larger than elsewhere in the FSU. However, to a less extreme extent
much the same picture of severe inadequacy and uncompetitiveness is shown by the government wage
structures and levels in the other countries of the region. Furthermore, in many countries where official
government wages are less inadequate, wage arrears are common, and are a major source of social
tension and personnel demotivation.- 26 -
It is unsurprising  that  in the first  stage of the economic  transformation  policy,  attention
and  financial  resources  were  devoted  to the urgent  tasks  of privatization,  reforming  the price
and  exchange  system,  and  establishing  some measure  of fiscal and  monetary  control.  But it is
equally  unsurprising  that  the next  stage of the transformation-those  reforms  requiring
"affirmative  administrative  action"  -is  now  severely  hampered  by the absence  of the
mechanisms,  government  personnel  and  resources  necessary  to implement  them.  As the
Ukraine  example  shows  (see Box 6), the current  state of government  organization  and  of the
civil service in most  of the former  Soviet republics  is a serious  and  mounting  obstacle  to further
progress  in most  economic  and  social policy  areas.
Box 6. Ukraine:  Building  a New  Central  Government  Administration
In Ukraine, as in all former Soviet republics (except Russia), creation of a new national
administration from a former provincial government has been difficult, and is still embryonic.  The delay
in introducing a post-communist  Constitution has held back the formation of an effective  public
administration.  Currently, there are 73 central bodies of executive power - two or three times the number
of ministries in Western countries.  But the departments and ministries are very small compared to OECD
norms, with an average of only 230 staff each.  Much larger workforces than exist at present in Ukraine
would be required to undertake the range of functions carried out by most government ministries and
departments in the West. The total civilian government workforce is estimated at around 400,000
(including police), of whom 170,000  are in local government and 230,000  in central government (including
local personnel paid from the central budget).  Thus, at less than one percent of the population, total
civilian govermnent employenti  in Ukraine is far smaller than the norm in most developing or
developed countries. (Public sector employment, of course, is much larger, as it includes the vast
numbers of employees in public enterprises.) Moreover, of the 230,000  central government employees,
just 15,000  are on the headquarters' staff of ministries and administrative departments.
Despite the small workforce, productivity levels are low and there are areas of redundancy and
under-employment throughout the central civil service. As in other transition economies, Ukraine has
seen a dramatic deterioration in civil service salaries, both in real terms and relatively to other sectors.
Senior civil servants have been the worst affected and would require a 60% increase in salaries just to
restore their real incomes to the already-depressed 1992 levels. The low salaries have led to increasing
vacancy rates (currently about 15 to 20%),  demotivation, indiscipline, spread of secondary occupations
and difficulty in attracting young professional staff. The opportunities for training are also extremely
limited.
Civil service reform is urgent in Ukraine, and goes much deeper than the numbers, deployment
and average pay levels of civil servants.  There should be an explicit policy on the structure of civil service
remuneration, strong central personnel management capacity and good information systems. Measures
to retain and attract professional skills, and to train selectively senior managers, will be critical. Priority
should be given to identify training needs, design training programs in results-oriented management and
other skills for current and future managers and to establish a network of training centers to meet these
needs.  An action plan is required to implement the rules of conduct of civil servants, their recruitment,
duties and privileges, career development, staff appraisal, promotion, posting, grading and remuneration,
discipline, welfare, dismissal and retirement.  All these require high-level and consistent political support,
careful design and substantial financial and technical resources.- 27  -
One problem common to all transitional economies is how to combine the considerable
reservoir of technical knowledge of 'old' government employees while bringing in enough 'new
blood' to give the central civil service vitality and credibility.  The problem is complicated by
the widespread popular resentment against  civil servants, who are seen as guardians of the old
order; this factor, of course, also means that necessary retrenchment  measures are not likely to
carry net political costs. However, it is not easy to bridge the transition from a badly underpaid
government workforce with its inappropriate  skill profile to a higher-skilled civil service -
perforce adequately compensated.  (Several practical possibilities have been explored in various
countries, and are discussed in Chapter III.)
Figure 6 shows relative central government wages and total government employment as
percent of population in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  The difference between
the two sub-regions is evident, with Eastern Europe showing both higher wages and lower
employment.  (Recall  that most of central government in countries of the former USSR is
accounted for by education and health, with central government administration  at a modest
size.) For neither sub-region, however, is there any statistically-significant association between
wages and central government employment.
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4.  Latin America and Caribbean
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the central civil service in many countries still
suffers from inefficiency, wastage, corruption and weak capacity to provide public services.
However, an extensive devolution of financial and administrative power to local governments
has occurred in the last decade.  The diffusion of administrative responsibilities (and authority)
away from the center has had far-reaching implications for the civil service. Particularly
remarkable has been the shift in responsibility in the education and health fields. Teachers and
health personnel in the central government account for just 0.1% of population, because most of
them have been shifted to local government (as in Argentina - see Box 7).- 28 -
Civil  servants,  too, appear  to be adequately  remunerated,  with  average  central
government  wages  over  two and  a half times  per capita  GDP.  In smaller  countries  of the
region,  however,  reforms  have  sometimes  bypassed  the main  body  of administration  and
created  an enclave  of better-paid,  more  skilled,  personnel  -usually  siphoned  off into donor-
assisted  projects.  (See, for example,  the experience  of Bolivia, summarized  later in Box 13.)
Box 7.  Argentina:  Downsizing  and Reforming  the Central Government
During 1970s  and 1980s,  government employment rose continuously, reaching 1.9 million by
1989. At the same time, revenue dropped  and the fiscal deficit grew.  The salary structure was
compressed dramatically from a compression ratio of 10:1  in the 1970s to 4:1 by 1989. By that year, the
situation warranted immediate reforms in personnel and pay policies. Accordingly, the Laws for
Administrative Reform and Economic Emergency were passed, providing for the necessary legislative
framework.  Two measures were taken to reduce personnel levels: (i) a program of voluntary retirement
which resulted in retiring about 10,000  public employees; and (ii) adoption of a vacancy freeze, which
had a great impact: the goverrunent workforce has not grown since the measure was taken.
In 1990,  President Menem initiated the state reform plan which included several measures. The
first was privatization of all state enterprises, through which 180,000  employees im  public enterprises
went to the private sector between 1990 and 1992. The second was decentralization of the health and
education system, which enabled transfer of both personnel and resources to the provincial jurisdictions.
An estimated 170,000  personnel were transferred.  The third set of measures included other cutbacks in
the central administration; elimination of organizations; cutbacks on political costs; limits on temporary
positions; early/voluntary  retirement; and redesign of administrative structures.  These measures cut in
half central government persornel.  The major issues for the future will be to ensure thiat  local
governments deliver social services in an efficient  way and are accountable for the use of the financial
and personnel resources transferred to them.
In February 1996, a law was approved for the Second Reform of the State. The law gives
authority to the Executive to eliminate or reorganize existing institutions (except for financial
institutions, universities and regulatory entities), to eliminate positions, and reduce the number of public
employees - including the military.  A Fund is created to finance severance pay and training on a
temporary basis.  The objective is to improve public services and reduce public expenditure.  The office
of the Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers is in charge of implementing the Second Reform of the State.
It is plausible  that  the devolution  of administrative  responsibility  (combined  with
largely  democratic  processes  at local levels) has been  a major factor  in the remarkable
improvements  in representative  governance  throughout  the region  in the last 10-15 years.
However,  there  is also a highly  respected  minority  view  (exemplified  by  Riordan  Roett) that  -
while  the facts of personnel  and  resource  decentralization  are real, the impact  on  efficiency  and
government  is illusory.  This is because,  in that  view, power  and  responsibility  have  been
devolved  to the local "branches"  of the same  national  elites.  Thus,  while  the influence  of the
elites may  now  be articulated  in a different  geographic  pattern,  genuine  devolution  of power
has  not occurred,  and  neither  social  service nor  governance  have  in fact been  improved  on  the
ground.  It is difficult  to be certain.  Clearly,  large  inter-country  differences  exist in the region,
and  equally  large  differences  between  the center  and  the periphery  in individual  countries.
One may  nevertheless  still conclude  that  the decentralization  and  devolution  trend  remains  the- 29 -
single best hope of improving the quality of, and widening the access to, social services, and
strengthening  whatever hopeful beginnings have been made in this direction.
Figure 7 shows relative central government wages and total government employment as
percent of population for a sample of countries in the region.  As in sub-Saharan Africa, an
inverse association between wages and employment is evident, with one-fifth the total variance
in wages explained by differences in employment.
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5.  Middle East  and North Africa
In MENA, large civil services were built up in the 1960s  and 1970s  to execute the vast
economic responsibilities assigned to the state in those years (and to provide employment to
college graduates), and were not slimmed down in proportion to the contraction of the role of
government in more recent times. With a few exceptions (e.g., Tunisia), the civil service in
MENA countries shares some negative characteristics of both Africa and South Asia. As in
Africa, there are skill problems and inadequate public service delivery; as in South Asia, over-
regulation has produced both a bloated workforce and pervasive interference in private
economic activity.  Little policy effort has been devoted to streamlining the government
workforce and improving its efficiency. Recently, with the end of the Cold War, the conclusion
of the Gulf War and the change in attitudes brought  about by the Arab-Israeli peace process,
governments in the region are beginning to turn their attention to the issue.  A major
explanation for inaction so far is that by far the single greatest economic and social problem in
the region (except for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States) is unemployment -largely  related to
high population  growth.  This makes government downsizing especially difficult.  In addition,- 30 -
the very low political  turnover  in most MENA  countries  - whatever  its advantages  might  be
argued  to be in terms  of political  stability  -has  atrophied  the system's  capacity  to change.
The challenge  of civil service reform  is further  complicated  in this  region by  difficult
issues  of national  unity  and  governance,  and  is intertwined  with  the debate  on  the appropriate
interaction  between  religion  and  society.  In their most  acute form,  these  issues  were  at the root
of the 15-year  civil war  in Lebanon  (see Box 8).  And  yet, even  under  the extreme  circumstances
of Lebanon,  the re-establishment  of peace  has  made  possible  the beginning  of civil service
rebuilding,  based  on a consensus  to insulate  a professional  civil service  (except at its top levels,
of course)  from religious  considerations.  Furthermore,  as in South  Asia, civil service  reform  in
MENA would  likely produce  substantial  fiscal savings.  Thus,  while  the risks  of genuine  civil
service reform  in the region  are comparatively  higher  than  elsewhere,  so would  be its economic
and  social payoff.
Box 8. Lebanon:  Reconstructing  the  Civil  Service  in the  Midst  of Religious  Pluralism
Lebanon, in the early 1970s  a middle-income country with a reasonably well-functioning public
administration and a vibrant private sector-led economy, was devastated by 15 years of civil war.  About
200,000  professional and skilled workers emigrated, resulting in severe skill shortages throughout the
economy. The damage to public administration was as severe as the damage to the buildings of
downtown Beirut. After the war, ministries and public agencies are operating with skeleton staff (only
7,400  of the 21,000  civil service posts are filled), since  tI  distortedj  and inadequate  tcompensation  package
does not attract qualified professionals. At.the same  time,  there is an excessive number of unqualified
daily workers. The average age of civil servants is 54, and the  yhave  been isolated for a long period from
the evolution of international practices in their field of activity. The basic proceduires of public
administration, established 35years ago orlonger, areover-ctraliiedand  outmoded.
The Minister of State for Administrative Reform is entrusted with the responsibility of
coordinating the rebuilding of the civil service and the public administration.  The key strategic choice has
been to 'renovate' and not only to 'reconstruct', i.e., not to reproduce the pre-war administrative
structures but to take the opportunity to leapfrog to more efficient  contemporary practices and methods.
Four inter-ministerial committees have been created to examine the salary scale, compensation, job
classification and organizational structure of specific mirtistries. A National Administrative
Rehabilitation Program has been formulated, and is being implemented partly with World Bank
assistance, to rebuild te  phy  l administrative structures, re-e,qui  them withUbasic  equipment and
supplies, introduce simple but contemporary information technology and svstems, and  provide selective
training and advisory services to ministries. The Program is seentin the context of fa  profound reform of
the civil service and the public administration.  The government  policy  intentions concerning the civil
service are to: carry out a civil service census to idenifyv  and remove ghost workers; conduct a series of
"Best Practice" workshops to expose participants to international experiences, provide a forum for open
internal discussion and facilitate the process of reform; reduce the number of permanent civil service
posts by 25%; reduce the number of daily and contractual workers to no more than 10% of total
permanent positions; introduce a  salary scale competitive with private salaries; introduce a standardized
performance evaluation system, including upward  feedback; and complete a major review of all civil
service regulations on recruitment, retention, evaluation, promotion, mobility, retirement and discipline
to achieve a major simplification and streamlining of procedures and processes. By the end of the reform
process, Lebanon hopes to achieve a small, efficient, well-equipped and motivated civil service, to
support and complement a private sector-led recovery of the economy.-31  -
In this sense, and as a very broad generalization, the challenge of civil service reform in
the Arab world is in a way intermediate between the African and the South Asian
predicaments.  As in Africa, structural reforms in the civil service are needed and the
governance implications are substantial; as in South Asia, such reforms would produce fiscal
savings and improve efficiency. The political difficulties of genuine reform, however, are
probably greater in MENA than in any other region; a promising approach could be, with all
due caution, to follow in the decentralization steps shown by Latin America.  In any event, the
first step in most MENA countries must be to prevent any further growth in central
government employment.
Figure 8 shows relative central government wages and total governmnent  employment as
percent of population for a sample of MENA countries.  As for ECA and Asia, there is no
evidence of any wage-employment association.  But, again, the chart is a convenient way to
summarize the placement of each country relative to the others of the same region.
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6.  OECD Countries
A discussion of civil service issues in OECD countries is outside the scope of this paper.
For the sake of completeness, however, Figure 9 below shows relative central government
wages and government employment as percent of population  for all OECD countries.  There
one does find a statistically significant inverse association-albeit  a marginal one.  Country-
specific time-series analyses would be necessary to establish the relationship between wages
and employment in the central government.
Let us conclude this section with an illustration of one of our key points: how
misleading these data can be if taken in isolation and at face value.  Thus, Sweden has the
largest government employment and the lowest relative wages of all OECD countries; Italy is
close to the mean in both respects.  Could one conclude from these facts that the Swedish civil
service is "bloated", "underpaid"  and "demotivated",  by comparison to the Italian "model"?- 32 -
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II.  CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: POLICY AND  IMPLEMENTATION
A.  AN ANALYTICAL  FRAMEWORK?
By contrast to the well-established basis for decisions on macroeconomic policy and on
the vast literature on economic growth, civil service issues and public administration  in general
appear to suffer from lack of an analytical framework.  It is indeed true that much analysis and
policy practice has been ad hoc. It need not be, however: elements of an analytical framework
are rarely used, but do exist. This paper is not the place for an extended discussion.  However,
it is useful to note some of the key building blocks even if telegraphically, and at the cost of
creating a discontinuity between this first section and the remainder of the paper..
First, the emphasis of public choice theory on the risk of capture of the regulators by the
regulated, on improving contestability and introducing clear contractual arrangements within
the public sector, is well-placed and has significant implications for the size and skills of the
government workforce.
Second,  the New Institutional Economics, with its emphasis on costly information and
transaction costs, provides a sound conceptual foundation for looking at civil service issues
(among other things).1 Briefly, the key considerations are as follows:
*  because information is not cost-less, transaction costs are a major determinant  of
economic activity, competitiveness and growth; in turn,
*  transaction costs are affected by the effectiveness of the prevailing institutions;
*  "institutions" are not organizations:  institutions are the laws, the procedures, the rules,
the customs (formal and informal) within which organizations must operate;
nevertheless,
- it is the interaction of institutions  and organizations which is key to "institutional
development" - i.e., a move to a more efficient set of rules, hence to lower transaction
costs and, ceteris  paribus, higher levels of economic activity;
*  it is evident that the effectiveness of organizations, and their interaction with the
regulatory framework, depends fundamentally  on the people of those organizations (in
the case of public administration, the civil service); and consequently,
*  the benefits of civil service reforms can be understood,  analyzed, and often even
measured in terms of their contribution to a move to more efficient institutions  and the
ensuing reduction in transaction costs within the public sector and throughout the
economy.
1 The founding  fathers  of the New  Institutional  Economics  are Ronald  H. Coase,  winner  of the 1991 Nobel Prize  for
Economics  (see Coase, 1989, for a collection  of his most  important  essays),  and Armen  A. Alchian  (Alchian,  1977,
contains  some of his  best papers).  Major contributions  have been made,  among  others,  by Douglass  North  (e.g.,
North,  1989) and Oliver  Williamson  (e.g., Williamson,  1985).  An excellent  summary  of the New  Institutional
Economics  by Thrain  Eggertsson  is found  in Schiavo-Campo,  1994.- 34 -
Third,  some of the ideas of what Paul Krugman calls the High Development Economics
of the 1950s  and early 1960s  can provide powerful analytical guidance to administrative  reform.
Let us take an example.  Albert Hirschman's  'unbalanced  growth' paradigm  of almost forty
years ago (Hirschman, 1958)  identifies the 'ability to invest' as the scarcest production  factor in
developing countries.  The reality of production  linkages thus combines with the scarcity of
ability to counsel concentrating public investment in sectors with maximum linkages to the rest
of the economy - thus facilitating  the next investment decisions.  By analogy, in civil service
development, we can argue that the operative constraint is found in the developing countries'
limited "capacity to reform".  The reality of costly information and skill problems thus combines
with the limited capacity to reform to counsel improving those civil service functions which are
key to facilitating subsequent  administrative improvements.  Naturally, the identification of
these key functions and the tactics of constructive intervention within a coherent overall reform
vision are extremely difficult propositions, as we shall see in Chapter III. But some strategic
guidance for civil service reform exists.
It is also abundantly  clear, from Douglass North's  concepts of "path  dependence"  as
well as from actual reform experience, that civil service reform entails changing both formal
and informal rules, customs and habits, and is therefore by its very nature a complex and
protracted affair.
B.  FRAMING  THE  ISSUE:  THE MEANING  OF CIVIL SERVICE  REFORM
Civil service reform is sometimes misunderstood  as limited to personnel retrenchment
and real wage reduction,  for fiscal policy objectives. In practice, this has often been the case,
which explains much of the suspicion of "civil service reform" in developing countries.
However, while this cost-containment dimension is important  in many countries, civil service
reform is much broader, and should be seen within the general context of public administration
and governance practices. The goal of civil service reform is a government  work force with the
size, skill-mix, motivation, professional ethos and accountability needed  to:  provide quality
public services; reduce transactions costs for the private sector; design and implement  economic
policy; and execute budgets and investment projects.  Thus, unlike firing people and cutting
salaries, the structural reforms carry potential social and political gains, in addition  to the
economic ones.  Of course, they are also far more complex and of long gestation, partly from the
need to develop a professional ethos, which is as important as technical competence and
accountability mechanisms.
The overall approach to CSR parallels the one appropriate  for institutional development
in general.  Rules must be improved  and their fair enforcement assured, if organizational
changes and training programs  are to be useful; change must be managed,  with the systematic
involvement of all concerned parties;  credible two-way information channels must be opened;
any reform program  must provide a role  for hope, maximize the number of potential allies and
reduce opposition, etc.
Civil service reform measures can be classified in the three categories of "diagnostic",
"cost-containment"  and "structural"  measures.  Cost containment includes mainly
retrenchment  of groups of employees or reductions in force from a reorganization  of
government  administration.  (Reductions in government  employment from contracting-out of- 35 -
social services are properly structural measures, and are not, or should not be, motivated by
fiscal saving per se.)  Diagnostic measures include civil service censuses, functional reviews,
institutional assessments, data collection, compendia of regulations etc.  (Diagnostic activities
also serve as non-confrontational  devices to initiate the reform process.) Structural measures
touch on the incentive framework, the system of civil service regulations, personnel
management, training, and accountability systems.
Diagnostic measures are discussed in Chapter III. We examine below the question of
retrenchment  and the most important among the structural  reforms:  the incentive framework
and the issue of accountability.
C.  "RIGHTSIZING"  AND  RETRENCHMENT  OPTIONS
1.  General considerations
Overstaffing is a relative notion.  That central government  employment may be
comparatively high in a particular country is a useful 'flag' for analysis, but proves nothing in
and of itself. The role of the government  may be larger in that country.  (The appropriate
debate in this case is on the large role of government, not on its corollary of a large work force.)
Or, the degree of government  centralization may differ.  (Ihe appropriate  debate in this case is
on subsidiarity, the vertical devolution  of government responsibilities, and not on the size of
the civil service per se.) Among industrial  countries, for example, while the French is among
the largest of central civil services (at about 2.7% of population) and the British among the
smallest (at 1.3%),  total government employment accounts for around  7% of the population  in
both France and the U.K. Thus, a relatively large work-force can be understaffed  if its size and
skills are not commensurate with the responsibilities assigned to it by the population.
Conversely, even a very small civil service can be 'overstaffed', if because of skill-mix or weak
accountability mechanisms the same level and quality of public services could be provided
with fewer employees.  The civil service regulatory  framework is also relevant for assessing
overstaffing:  in particular, reducing the obstacles to mobility within the civil service may
permit a smaller workforce without affecting service delivery, and/or  improve services.
Consequently, an assessment of the "right size" of government  employment must be
country-specific, and requires consideration, among other things, of: the functions assigned to
the state in that country; the choice of degree of administrative  centralization; the skill profile of
the civil service; and the regulations and constraints to mobility.  (What is certain is that any
new recruitment should follow specific, documented public needs; a policy of automatic
government  hiring of new college graduates has proven  everywhere to be a recipe for eventual
fiscal and administrative  problems.)
2.  Design and implementation  issues
When overstaffing is found, retrenchment  (if done right-see  Box 9) can provide the
wherewithal  to improve incentives and/or  produce net fiscal savings.  In addition, it can raise
morale (by "revaluing" public service) and stimulate performance of the remaining employees.
Nothing demoralizes a person faster than to work next to a less qualified, under-performing
and uncommitted  individual with the same rank and nominal responsibilities.  Nevertheless,- 36 -
overemphasis on retrenchment  (or knee-jerk recommendations  to reduce the workforce by
some arbitrary number without analytical and empirical justification) gives civil service reform
a bad name and maximizes resistance even to positive-sum reforms.  Moreover, retrenchment  is
almost always financially costly in the short term.
It is often politically costly as well, particularly when unemployment  is already high.
However, political costs are not inevitable.  (Often, as Frederick Malek put it, "the best politics
is good government".)  First, there are circumstances when the support  of the public at large for
retrenchment measures offsets the loss of support  from those directly involved-as  in many
Eastern European and FSU countries.  Second, well-managed change, for good reason and with
appropriate  explanations, candor and equity of action, helps defuse political opposition.
Retrenchment can be very counterproductive  when it's not done right:
*  the immediate risk is skill reduction-if  the program inadvertently  encourages the best
people to leave.  Voluntary severance and early retirement  can be especially problematic
in this respect.  The difficulty is that it is just these measures which are administratively
and humanly  easiest to carry out, and are on the rise also because of their appeal to civil
servants themselves;
v  the near-term risk is the recurrence of overstaffing-if  personnel management,
information and control systems are not strengthened  before or at the same time as
retrenchment  occurs -and  loss of credibility of the reform process;
*  the broader risks are demoralization of employees, lower service quality and credibility
loss-if  the retrenchment  program is perceived as arbitrary and opaque, particularly  in
societies ridden with ethnic, clan or religious conflict.
The general conclusion is not that retrenchment  measures can be avoided.  In many
countries, downsizing  is virtually mandated  by fiscal needs; in others, it is a necessary
component of structural  reform.  But retrenchment should be approached  as part of an
improvement  in the efficiency and quality of government functions.  Retrenchment  is a means,
not an end in itself; the end is the efficient provision of public services. In any event, experience
shows that retrenchment  must be designed  with great care  and respect  for the 'law  of unintended
consequences',  and implemented as transparently  as possible and with ironclad observance of
clear and specific criteria determined in advance.  It is impossible to overstate the importance of
candid and open communications.  Cooperation by the media is therefore important.- 37 -
Box 9.  Rightsizing:  Some  Lessons  from  Experience
While there is need for better information on the nature of the labor market adjustment across
countries, some recent studies on employment restructuring offer the following lessons:
*  earnings losses are not an adequate measure of welfare losses, particularly for workers who may
withdraw from the labor force after separation (for such workers, a better predictor of the welfare loss
from displacement is the gap between the wage in the public sector and the reservation wage);
*  the rules-of-thumb typically used to set compensation packages, which involve some multiple of the
public sector wage, may be grossly misleading, since they ignore other individual characteristics that
may be related to the welfare loss, such as schooling or the number of dependents;
*  the gains from better-tailored severance pay may be significant, and the magnitude of the estimated
savings, in turn, suggests that there is a case for carefully preparing downsizing operations: a study
shows that even over-estimation of the gains from better-tailored compensation would have led to
savings of an order far exceeding the cost of a study using micro-economic data to determine which
workers are actually redundant,  and how much they should receive as compensation;
*  younger workers with high state tenure are more likely to leave;
*  state leavers appear to suffer much higher levels of unemployment than the average for their area;
*  those at risk of unemployment are particularly younger women, and older males;
*  younger men with lower severance payments are more likely to be employed and higher severance
payments appear to be used mainly for self-employment and retirement;
*  programs that use targeting on the basis of skills and age, use multiple methods of employment
reduction, and use a combination of compensation packages that include enhancements of the safety
net for assisting the reallocation of workers are much less likely to exhibit problems with re-hiring;
while programs with this multi-dimensional approach tend to be expensive, there are potentially
large payoffs in productivity gains and reducing adjustment costs;
*  seniority-weighted severance packages are likely to lead to the loss of younger, higher-tenure, more
educated, and more able workers;
*  income supports or retraining may be especially important for young women, and provision of start-
up capital for self-employment may reduce the unemployment of older males and females;
*  it is possible to achieve a targeted number of employment reductions, without unnecessary cost, by
modulating the level  of severance payments; and
*  more analysis is needed to so design the structure  of severance payments as to induce the desired
distributions of workers leaving and staying.
Sources:  Rama and Macisaac  (1996),  Robbins (1996),  HaltiwangeT  and Singh (1996).
D.  WAGES AND INCENTIVES  POLICY
1.  General  considerations
The fiscal benefit  of wage  containment  is obvious,  but must  not be allowed  to drive
wage  policy.  Certainly,  in cases when  public  wages  are too high  relative  to private  wages,- 38 -
cutting them improves resource allocation and equity as well.  However, developing  countries
typically have today barely competitive or inadequate public wages.  In these cases,  reductions
in real wages set in motion a vicious circle of demotivation, under-performance,  and
justification for further reductions.  (The reverse can be true as well: wage improvements, even
if insufficient, can set in motion a positive dynamic:  as Benjamin Higgins has noted, what is
important in vicious circles is the circularity of the process-and  not its 'viciousness'.)
The bottom of this spiral is all too well known: a de-skilled labor force, too poorly paid
to resist temptation,  utterly cowed when faced with pressures from politicians and influential
private interests, and unable to perform in minimally adequate ways.  And because everyone is
aware of the compensation problem and petty corruption is rife, society loses its legitimate
claim to honest and efficient performance by its public servants.  Beyond the direct
deterioration  of public goods and services, the result is a worsening economic climate for the
private sector and an increase in transaction costs-the  exact economic equivalent of
technological retrogression.  The general conclusion is to resist the temptation  to fix fiscal  problems
by distorting  incentives:  even a badly-designed  retrenchment program is better than severing the
link between salaries and opportunity  cost.
2.  The design  of civil service compensation
It is important to realize that much civil service reform, and particularly pay reform, has
typically taken place under conditions of fiscal crisis and a diminishing  capacity of government
to perform its tasks efficiently and effectively.  (Indeed, there are very few instances where civil
service reforms were introduced  in the absence of fiscal pressure, to improve public services
and civil service performance.)  Government responses to crisis have tended  to avoid
retrenchment  by eroding real government pay, compress salary structures and reduce
expenditure on complementary inputs.  Consequently, rehablltation  of governmentperformance
will require  policies  that eliminate  redundancy  and restore  the linkages  between  compensation  and effort.
Since redundant  civil servants, by definition, have a marginal product of zero, eliminating
genuine redundancy  potentially improves government performance and stimulates public
service production.  A prerequisite, of course, is the accurate prior identification, and retention,
of personnel with skills well adapted to their jobs-which  is far easier said than done.
The nexus between compensation and performance is complex, but the consequences of
wage erosion are visible everywhere -increased  turnover rates and absenteeism, moonlighting
and sunlighting, difficulty in recruitment and retention, rise in petty corruption, etc. In the oft-
quoted passage on the Ugandan situation of the 1980s:  "...The civil servant had either to survive
by lowering his standard of ethics, performance and dutifulness or remain upright and perish.
He chose to survive"  (1982  Ugandan "Report of the Public Commission," cited in Lindauer  and
Nunberg,  1994,  p.27). Complicating the situation is the typical lack of a systematic base for civil
service pay comparability with the private sector and the public enterprises-leading  civil
servants to believe they are more underpaid  than is in fact the case and the public at large to
have the opposite misconception.
The classic problem in civil service compensation is how to value the labor that
produces the output of civil servants, given that such output is generally not marketable.  The
general solution is to make compensation comparable (not equal) to that for equivalent skills
which are marketed, i.e. private sector pay.- 39 -
a.  The context: Factors influencing civil service compensation
Civil service compensation operates in practice within the broad framework of public
sector compensation, legislative oversight and judicial review of administrative/executive
action.  It is therefore informed by public policy considerations in the shape of constitutional
provisions, legislative enactments (whether federal/central  or state) and executive rules and
regulations, tempered and interpreted  by judicial pronouncements  and reviews.  Some of the
common public policies impacting civil service compensation are:
-Collective bargaining policies;
- Minimum wage laws;
- Prevailing wage laws;
- Minimum benefits laws;
-Maximum pay policies;
- Incomes policies;
-Equal pay and anti-discrimination  statutes;
-Pay comparability laws;
- Competitive pay policies;






b.  The objectives of compensation policy
Although in practice there are severe problems in meeting and implementing the
different objectives of compensation policy, the objectives themselves are simple and intuitively
reasonable.
Objective  1: Equal  pay should  be  given for equal  work  performed  under the same  conditions.
Empirical evidence shows that this is not always so. First, strong unions have sometimes
succeeded in winning for their members higher pay than others similarly skilled but less able to
negotiate a better deal.  Second, the divergence may be due to special or peculiar conditions,
such as a merit system, measurement  of earnings by quantity or quality of production,  and
differences in location of work  Third, as discussed later, cross-country data show that female
employees tend to be paid less than their male counterparts.  Finally, personal and political
patronage  in countries with governance problems results in, among other things, endemic
violations of the basic principle of equal pay for equal work.
Objective  2:  Differences  In pay should  be based  on differences  In work  performed,
responsibilities  assigned,  and qualifications  required
Graded classification systems (see below) are better able to achieve this objective,
particularly since they make pay differences proportional  to work differences.
Objective  3:  Levels  of government  pay should  be comparable  to those  In the  private sector.-40  -
Compensation  plan design must take account of this external aspect of comparability, or
"fair comparison" (in addition to the internal aspect catered to by classification systems).  Note
that "comparable" does not mean equal.  In cases where public service demands higher
qualifications and prior education investment, it might be justified for government wages to be
higher than their private equivalent.  In the more typical cases, the greater job security and
(sometimes) greater prestige of public services justifies a somewhat lower compensation
package.  (As we have seen earlier, in practice the "discount"  on government work is generally
between 20-30%-see  Table 2.)
One of the most sophisticated efforts at establishing rates of civil service pay by levels of
remuneration  outside has been that conducted  by Britain's Civil Service Pay Research Unit.
Using the "fair comparison" norm, the unit conducted regular pay surveys to establish rates of
pay in each "main grade" in the civil service. Linked to these main grades or "key rates" are a
large number of grades  ("consequentials") containing smaller numbers of employees, so that
over the cycle of pay surveys, the rates of all non-industrial  civil servants are automatically
adjusted.  These exercises in fact led to large civil service pay increases, at times even
overtaking the private sector.  Staff associations played a very important role in these pay
research exercises. Salaries of top civil servants in Britain, who do not engage in collective
bargaining, are set by the Top Salaries Review Body.  (The World Bank itself has a sophisticated
"comparator"  system, which will not be discussed here.)
Objectlve  4:  Levels  of government  compensation  should be  periodicallyzreviewed  and
systematically  revised  to assure the continued  validity of the compensation  plan.
Country experience indicates that this is not always the case. In Jamaica, for instance,
while the Consumer Price Index rose by 470%  from 1972  to 1982,  the salaries of the three
highest grades of civil servants rose only by between 40% and 90%. In contrast, salaries of
government-employed  casual labor rose by 360% over the same period.  In Guyana, between
1986  and 1991,  real wages in the central government  fell by almost 20%, with even greater
deterioration  in the managerial, professional and technical (MP')  grades.  Real salaries in
Uganda similarly declined by 20% to 33% peryear between 1975  and  1983. Real per capita
salaries generally declined in Africa during this period, the fall being particularly  marked in
Ghana, Nigeria and Zambia.  Naturally, the objective of periodic review of compensation can
be met effectively only when the compensation structure and level are appropriate  to begin
with.
c.  Design of a compensation plan
There are two main methods for determining civil service compensation in actual
practice. One is the trial-and-error  method, by ascertaining what salaries are required  to attract
and retain the required employees with the appropriate  skills. By its very nature, this is an ex-
post method and therefore effective only at the margin. The second approach, and one which is
widely employed,  is to use some form of comparison  with the  private sector.  Both these methods
are also influenced in varying degree by collective bargaining, depending upon the country and
the category of civil servants.  These methods are not mutually exclusive.  On the contrary, each
can correct and improve the other.
The starting point is usually ajob classification  exercise, in which the positions are
systematically arranged.  As noted, a sound pay plan should provide equal pay for equal work-41 -
and the same pay for comparable jobs. This in turn involves the acquisition and analysis of
large amounts of information, such as:
*  the skill, effort and responsibility attached to each job;
*  the duties of each job;
*  whether the jobs are routine or not;
*  which jobs require supervision; and
*  which jobs are difficult or hazardous  or have other special features.
Based on such information, like jobs are grouped  into classes,  and classes involving
similar work at different levels of difficulty and responsibility  are grouped  into occupations.
These occupations, in turn, are grouped  into major occupational  categories  or groups.
Many kinds of classification plans exist, but the most important distinction is whether
the plan is "graded"  or "ungraded".  Graded  classification  plans have the following
characteristics:
*  a formalized procedure for measuring the level of difficulty, effort and responsibility of
each class of positions;
*  identification of "grades"  (also called "skill levels"), each constituting a specified level
of difficulty, skill and responsibility, with successively higher grades constituting
successively higher levels of difficulty, effort and responsibility. All classes in any one
grade are supposed to require essentially the same level of difficulty, effort and
responsibility, regardless of the occupation to which the class belongs; and
*  a single pay range for all positions in all classes assigned to any one grade. No other
grade in the same pay plan uses that pay range.
Graded classification plans provide equal  pay for equal  work  wnthin  each  occupation  and
among  different  occupations.  They also have the advantage of being administratively  stable in
general and able to serve large establishments with even thousands  of job classes, since pay
levels for only a small number of grades are required to be set.  Different techniques are used to
measure the degree of difficulty, effort and responsibility of each class of jobs.  These include
factor ranking, point rating, factor comparison and hybrid comparisons.
By contrast, ungraded  classffications  provide  equal  pay for equal  work only In the same
occupation.  Their principal advantages are that they are simple in concept and structure  and are
therefore easily designed and installed.  Under such classifications, pay changes for individual
classes can be made whenever a need arises, without having to change the entire pay schedule.
No clear recommendation can be made to apply to all countries.  There are advantages
and disadvantages  to both classifications. In general, the trade-off in graded versus ungraded
compensation plans is between flexibility and equity - or, to put it differently, between short-
term and long-term efficiency. Also, graded  classifications  are superior  only when they are correct.
If the exercise instead produces phony or self-serving job classifications (as is sometimes the
case in practice), its greater cost is not even justified by a better outcome.
d.  Content of a compensation plan
Typically, a compensation plan should cover, more or less in the following order:- 42 -
(i)  an identification of the kinds of positions and employees to which it is applicable;
(ii)  a statement of the basic governing pay policy: for example, the intended  relationship to
prevailing compensation levels in the private sector, and what  kinds of compensation
are encompassed  (base salary only, or base and certain allowances and benefits);
(iii)  the pay schedule;
(iv)  the classes of jobs to which the plan applies, showing the pay range assigned to each
class;
(v)  schedules of premium pay rates and rules covering, for example, overtime pay, holiday
and weekend pay, etc.;
(vi)  rules for determination of pay on promotion,  transfer, demotion, etc.;
(vii)  rules of pay under special conditions, e.g., dual jobs in the same jurisdiction, military
and jury duty, weather emergencies, etc.;
(viii)  rules regarding  special pay rates, e.g., to alleviate recruitment  difficulties for a specific
class of positions;
(ix)  rules regarding pay on different kinds of leave, e.g. maternity leave, study leave; and
(x)  rules for resolution of anomalies and discrepancies and redress of employee grievances
regarding pay decisions.
3.  Major implementation  issues
a.  Treatment  of non-wage  benefits
One major problem in comparing private and public sector compensation, or the erosive
impact of inflation on real civil service compensation, has been identifying and quantifying
non-salary civil service benefits. Non-salary benefits take such myriad forms as spouse and
dependency  allowances; pensions; health and liability insurance; free or subsidized housing
and social services; free or subsidized meals; transportation  allowances; leave with pay and
others too numerous  and varied to mention.  In the former Soviet Union, for example,
employees are often given free housing by the entities for which they work  In rural France,
municipalities are still responsible for housing public school teachers. (The salary of rural
teachers is considerably lower than that of teachers in large cities.) In  India, civil servants are
given subsidized housing, with some posts, such as superintendent  of jails, carrying free
housing.  Free education and health care are widespread  means of compensating public
employees, both in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (where state-owned  enterprises used to
provide such services), and elsewhere in the world.  Direct or indirect food subsidies are also
common, from subsidized employee restaurants to direct handouts; for example, in
Afghanistan, from the years of the Soviet occupation, civil servants have been given vegetable
oil and wheat flour at no charge, along with a free meal per day, instead of a salary increase.  It
should be recalled, however, that fringe benefits are not certainly unknown  in the private sector
either -from  company cars to club memberships, etc.
The case for scrutiny of non-wage benefits is stronger the more precipitous the decline
in real wages.  This is because, while some fringe benefits can have a positive role in a well-
designed compensation package, others are inefficient and can have demotivating and
incentive-distortion effects. Partly a colonial legacy (having been designed for foreign
administrators), such benefits and allowances tend to assume increasing importance as the real
value of salary declines.  Governments have also been known, particularly before elections, to
shower largesse through this tactic to woo support, sometimes with disregard to its impact on- 43 -
already straitened public finances.  Staff associations and unions have also used this tactic to
keep their members happy.  (A particularly inefficient allowance is the "meeting allowance"
used in some countries, e.g., until recently, Tanzania.  The allowance understandably  results in
maximizing the number of meetings and minimizing their substance, a perfect way to interfere
with administrative efficiency.)
Greater diligence in probing fringe benefits is, however, no guarantee  of success in
uncovering them, since they are often country/region/organization/service-specific,  and
lodged in the nooks and crannies of the budget documents. Some, like free housing or
transportation,  may even be off-budget.  Indeed, a proliferation of extra-budgetary  funds, in
addition to weakening the integrity of the public expenditure  management process also distorts
in practice the civil service compensation system.  The fact that such give-aways are often not
subject to outside knowledge or review is convenient for both the granters and the
beneficiaries.
Countries such as Indonesia, Liberia and Botswana have adopted reforms by replacing
some benefits in kind with a compensatory adjustment in pay. This allows civil servants to pay
for the quantity  of goods or services consumed. Guinea eliminated rice rations, Cameroon
reduced housing allowances and Bolivia abolished special performance premiums  in efforts to
monetize and rationalize remuneration.  However, the impact of these measures appears to be
negligible, so far.  In any case, effective measures must be taken to prevent the reemergence of
the very same benefits-in-kind that have been monetized and added to basic pay.
b.  The gender gap
Salary inequalities between men and women are persistent.  Although mirroring
compensation practices in the larger society, government employment has typically failed to
provide the model and the leadership for putting into practice the elementary fairness and
efficiency principle of "equal pay for equal work".  It should be a continuing priority for
government  and external donors alike to plan for greater and greater convergence in pay equity
for men and women in government service - albeit in a manner that is mindful of country
traditions and customs.  The gender gap is widest in developing countries, but the problem
persists even in highly industrialized  economies (see Box 10).-44  -
Box 10.  The  Gender  Gap
Although discrimination  on the basis of gender is now explicitly  prohibited in  most  countries, there
remains a difference between women's wages and men's wages  - referred to as the "gender pay gap" - in
many areas of civil  service compensation. The gender gap is especially large in developing countries. But
even in developed countries, the following points are worth noting:
* @  :  :Women'sjobs have traditionally been undervalued and thus compensated less than men's jobs,
:  leading tosituations such as theone in  :Denver, Colorado wherenurses  were:paid lessthantree
trinimers.
* 0  In the USA, figures for the period1960-1990  from the  Department  of Commere  indicate that
median earinigs  of women have fluctuated b  e57%  and 70% of male median earnings.
* :  i  n:Australia it was;  not until 1972  that the principle of equal pay for equal work was adopted.
Indeed, a landmark judicial decision in a 1912  case  justified lower wages for women because, unlike
men, they did not generally support a family. Thereafter, a:practice  of fixing the female pay rate as a
percentage of the basic male wage rate was begun by the judge. That rate was officially fixed  at 54%
until 1949,when it was increased to 75%. By  the end of the 1970s,  however, base pay for women
had risen from 74% to 94% of that of men.
0  *  tNew  Zealand offilly  sanctionedtdifferent  wage raites  for menm  and women1903,  legislatively
authorized in 1934  and 1945.  Onlyin 1972  was the EqUal  Pay Actopassed.T  Thereaftr,  hourly
earnings of females rose from 71.3%  of male earnings in 1973  to 78.5%  in19i7.
*  Britain,  too, expliitly  countenanced gender-based pay-discrimination till 1M5 when the Equal Pay
Act of 1970  came into effect.
c.  Salary  Compression
In addition  to pay  erosion,  salary  compression  has been  another  chronic  problem  of civil
service pay  structures  in many  countries.  Wage reduction  in practice  has  entailed  larger
proportionate  cuts at higher  levels  (and/or  salary  caps).  Although  understandable  from  a
short-term  equity  point  of view,  the longer-term  impact  of such  an approach  has been  minimal
to both  efficiency  and  equity.  In particular,  progressively  worse  salary  compression  eventually
leads  to loss of employees  with  options,  i.e., the better  employees.  Internationally,  the
compression  ratio  (the ratio of the midpoint  of the highest  salary  grade  to the midpoint  of the
lowest)  varies  widely,  from highs  of 30:1 or more  to lows  of 2:1 - with  a mode  of around  6 or 7
to one.  Note that  an increase  in the ratio means  decompression  of the salary  structure.  As a
result,  particularly  in Africa,  decompression  of the wage  structure  is an irmportant  objective  of
civil service  reform.  The compression ratio for selected  countries  in the early  1980s and  early
1990s is shown  in Table  4.- 45 -
Table 4: Wage compression ratios,
selected  countries,  variousyears
Country  Late 1970s  Early 1990s
Central African Republic  9:  1  9 :1
Gambia  8:1  6:1
Ghana  6:  1  10: 1
Guinea  9:  1  5: 1
Guinea-Bissau  5:  1  4:  1
Laos  3:1  7:1
Malawi  33: 1  30: 1
Mauritania  7:1  3:1
Mozambique  2:1  9:1
Niger  18:1  15:1
Nigeria  18:1  9:1
Senegal  8:1  6:1
Sudan  13:1  9:1
Turks and Caicos  7:  1  4:1
Uganda  6:  1  8:  1
Zambia  14: 1  7:  1
Source:  Barbara  Nunberg, 'Experience  with civil  service  pay and employment  reform: an
overview",  in Nunberg  and Lindauer,  1994.
The decompressions in salary structure seen in the cases of Ghana, Laos, Mozambique
and Uganda were due to specific decompression objectives forming part of pay reform
programs.  In the absence of civil service reform programs, the economic difficulties and more
stringent fiscal constraints of the 1980s  have tended to cause government  wages in most
developing countries to become more compressed, and incentives to suffer as a result.
d.  Grade inflation:  the worst response to inadequate compensation levels
It is understandable  that a public sector manager, confronted with deserving staff with
badly inadequate salaries, is tempted to promote them to levels for which they are not qualified
as a way to prevent further deterioration in their real salary.  However, in a very short period,
grade inflation produces  all the disadvantages  of inadequate incentives and in addition
destroys the government  capacity to manage its human resources.  Examples abound  in the
developing world.  Thus, in Trinidad and Tobago, disguised pay increases were given by filling
upper/middle  professional vacancies with under-qualified staff on acting basis, while pay
scales were too low at high levels and too high at low levels, causing severe imbalance in
employment.  Guyana, too, suffered from grade inflation through filling of vacancies by
unqualified persons on acting basis; there was resentment and loss of morale among civil
servants because special salaries and allowances were paid to staff in some ministries and not
others; there were distortions in structured  pay systems due to unapproved  recruitment; and
temporary hiring at higher rates and through  contracts.  And in Yemen, the practice of bringing
in unqualified outsiders to fill high-level positions for which they were totally unsuited was
widespread,  especially after unification in 1990,  and was a major factor responsible for the
degradation of the civil service since 1992  (see Box 11). All of these ad hoc responses to- 46 -
inadequate  compensation  ruined  the system  on which  more  adequate  incentives  could  be built
in the future.
Box 11.  Yemen:  Facing  Up to the Administrative  Cost of Unification,  Civil War,  and
Patronage
After the 1990  unification between North and South Yemen, central government civilian
employment in Yemen grew from 65,000 in the North before 1990 to almost half a million, or about 3%
of the population, compared to an average of 1.4%  for the Middle East and North Africa.  The initial
increase was due to the creation of parallel administrative structures with different traditions and
extensive duplication of functions, consequent to the merger with the South. The government also
absorbed many former employees of Southern public enterprises, and acted as employer of last resort
for new school graduates.  Finally, and most damaging, the civil service was increasingly used as a
source of personal and political patronage.  The personnel management system virtually collapsed: an
unknown number of persons collect salaries of deceased persons and in some cases more than one
salary under different identities; it is reported that about half of the govermnent employees do not even
report for work or report for only part of the day; under-qualified people were hired by the tens of
thousands; and ineligible ones indiscriminately promoted.  Given the fiscal constraints, the bloated
government payroll has led to much lower real wage levels and narrowed the difference between the
highest and lowest salaries. This erosion of incentives and disregard for qualifications and performance
has resulted in general deterioration of employee disciplime,  morale and performance. Consequently,
the delivery of social services to the population was also badly affected.
In order to gradually reverse this deterioration, the government is considering a demanding
agenda for reform of public administration.  Immediate measures would include a freeze on all types of
recruitment; sequestering of all future vacancies arising out of retirement, termination, death or
resignation; temporary halt in promotions except in individual exceptions expressly approved by the
Prime Minister; and halt on absorption of contractual and temporary employees into permanent
positions. Short-term measures would involve a complete census of all types of employees; removal of
ghost workers from the payroll; an improved personnel management information system; completion of
studies on job classification, personnel procedures and salary structure; and deciding on the
recommendations through a participatory approach.  Medium-term measures would aim to implement
the recommendations of the studies; simplification of regulations;,review of the functions, organization
and cost effectiveness of government and key ministries; a mechanism for re-certifying employees in
order to screen out those without minimal qualifications; and a program for deploying others.  As part
of the long-term measures, each ministry and agency would be required to submit a concrete
restructuring plan consisting of a statement of objectives;  strategies for achieving these objectives;
staffing program; a time table for staffing decisions; simple indices of administrative performance;
training needs; and financial requirements.  Once the plan is approved  and implementation begins, the
ministry in question would be allowed to freely recruit from other ministries; resume normal wage
increases and promotions; have its reasonable financial needs met; and move up to the new salary scale
established in the meantime. However, the government is yet to take the significant, immediate
measures essential to begin the reform process and give it credibility in the eyes of the public.
e.  Perfornance Pay?
In recent  years,  largely  from  an understanding  of the disadvantages  of compressing  the
wage structure,  the question  of wage  increases  targeted  to scarce skills and/or  essential
functions  has moved  to the forefront  of policy  attention.  (Similarly,  training  is now  being  seen- 47 -
more as a focused way to fill selected skill gaps rather than an across-the-board program to lift
the general educational level of the workforce.)  This is entirely legitimate.  However, a word of
caution about 'performance pay'  is in order here.  The notion is very attractive in theory.
(Indeed, in some sense, all pay is for performance.)  It is intuitively appealing to link bonus
schemes (not increases in base salaries) to yearly performance in terms of specific quantified
output measures.  Unfortunately,  the empirical evidence shows that performance pay schemes
have been only marginally effective in improving performance (see, for example, Mikovich and
Wigdor, 1991),  especially in the public sector where outputs  (despite recent innovations-e.g.,
in New Zealand) remain difficult to quantify.  Performance pay can also introduce an
additional element of political control over the career civil service. And in multi-ethnic, multi-
religious or clan-based societies, performance pay can be lethal to a delicate social balance; even
when administered  fairly and well (which is hardly likely in such societies) the perception of
favoritism is next to impossible to prevent.  The intent here is not to dismiss performance pay
options, but to caution against "fashion" and to recommend careful analysis of the specific
situation to ascertain whether their benefits outweigh their costs (and risks).
While performance pay schemes may or may not be appropriate, meaningful
performance incentives  are a must.  First and foremost, the overall salary structure and the
recruitment  and advancement  system must reward  performance and penalize  (and correct)
under-performance.  Nothing demoralizes good public servants and destroys performance
more than favoritism and patronage  in recruitment and promotion.  In addition, human beings
do not live by bread alone: non-monetary  incentives can be very important, especially among
the professional ranks.  These may include more challenging tasks, influential assignments,
public recognition, training opportunities  and professional rewards, among other things.  In
any case, informed, candid and equitable performance assessment is the cornerstone of any
incentive system.
E.  IMPROVING  ACCOUNTABILITY
Without  improvements in effective accountability, rightsizing and adequate incentives
will result in a small, well-paid, and inefficient and corrupt civil service. Accountability, like
wage adequacy and overstaffing, is a relative notion.  Strengthening  civil servants'
accountability to their administrative superiors  (and, one hopes, to their subordinates  as well)
may be necessary.  But strengthening  internal administrative  accountability is rarely sufficient
to produce an improvement  in government  efficiency and the quality of services to the public,
because internal controls are often ineffective-especially  when the social ethos tolerates
collusion between supervisors and subordinates.
"Outward  accountability", therefore, is essential for greater responsiveness to the needs
of the public and thus to improve service quality-whether  it is the individual civil servant
who is directly accountable, or the service unit, or the ministerial department  as a whole.
Outward  accountability can be increased in a variety of ways-user  surveys, individual name-
tags, investigative journalism,  media access (e.g., radio talk programs), whistleblower  laws,
public opinion polling, etc.  (Various devices to this end have been pioneered recently in
Australia, U.K. and New Zealand.)  Unfortunately, early attempts at canvassing user views in
developing  countries have not always been carried out by statistically sound methods.  This is a
must:  anecdotal evidence or casual surveys produce distorted  findings and result in- 48 -
unwarranted  rewards or penalties for those affected, harming the very credibility of the
approach.
A rise in individual accountability must be accompanied by commensurate rewards  and
consequences for non-performance  (training, rather than penalties, may be the right response).
The weight of evidence from all countries shows that the lack of credible consequences turns
serious accountability reforms into bureaucratic formality.  Here, the  magnitude of the  reward  or
the severity of the  penalty matter less than their  certainty,  swiftness and fair and uniform application  .
Dependent  as they are on the growth of public expectations and development  of a
professional service ethos among government  employees, improvements in outward
accountability should be permanently  incorporated into the management  agenda of every
governmental department  responsible for service provision.  The interface between the need for
outward  accountability and the desirability of a participatory  approach is evident and strong:
the real experts on how to improve accountability are those whose own accountability is weak.
Decentralization, too, provides opportunities  to improve service design, targeting and
delivery-although  it also carries the risk of reducing systemic accountability if not carefully
designed and monitored.  Finally, not only can private participation  to the provision  of certain
social services improve the services in question but the resulting climate of 'contestability' has a
salutary effect on public sector efficiency in other services as well.
F.  SELECTED  CIVIL  SERVICE  ISSUES  OF  LOCAL  GOVERNMENTS
1.  General considerations
Decentralization is increasingly being urged in different countries on grounds  of
efficiency, effectiveness, coverage, participation, empowerment  and sustainability. The details
need not be gone into at this point, except to say that experience from different countries
suggests that there might be a wide variation in the extent of applicability of these justifications.
Decentralization is also argued for on the grounds that local governments, especially cities,
could levy higher taxes and could thereby charge residents the full marginal cost of
development  (which would, in the case of cities, lead to a more efficient size distribution); that
a higher rate of national resource mobilization could be achieved since local governments  could
tax some sectors of the economy more easily than the central government.  A further boost to
greater autonomy for local areas has been the increase in the frequency and stridency with
which ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic and other identities are being asserted in different
regions of the world.
Local governments typically face a number of personnel problems and possibilities
additional to those discussed in earlier sections. Although a full discussion of human resource
issues in local government  belongs under the heading of administrative  decentralization-a
vast topic not covered in this paper-certain  considerations are necessary to place the global
civil service issues in context.  The term "local government"  as used here (as in the comparative
statistics presented  in Chapter I) means all government  entities other than the central
government.  Such non-central governments  can include state/provincial  governments, as well
as urban/rural  elected bodies of different kinds.  Some of the key issues are identified below.- 49 -
2.  Employment  issues
Some of the employment issues specific to local government  are:
*  Given the wide variety of tasks assigned to different tiers of local government,  it may
not be possible, or even necessary, to arrive at an optimum number of employees for an
entity;
*  The need for specialized personnel is partly related to the size of the territory covered
by the entity.  Below a certain level, it is not cost-effective for each similar unit to have
specialists/technical  personnel.  This is of particular relevance for developing
economies where there is a general shortage of technically qualified personnel;
*  A decision is needed on whether recruitment  of all civil servants is done by each local
entity, by a central organization, or by intermediate mechanisms  (e.g., middle executives
locally recruited and the top level centrally appointed);
*  How to ensure transparency  in appointments  and recruitment,  and whether and to
what  extent uniformity of classification of posts and qualifications is required;
*  In areas sensitive to race, religion, language and ethnicity, how to ensure that all
persons similarly circumstanced are treated alike for purposes of public employment
and that no person or group is discriminated  against;
*  The arrangements for accountability of civil servants; for ensuring certain and swift
punishment  for transgressions; for equally certain and swift rewards; for protecting
honest and independent  civil servants from political and other harassment; and for
allocating training funds and deciding on training programs;
*  The setting and monitoring of performance standards.
3.  Compensation  issues
Overall wage policy has been discussed earlier. Compensation issues for local
governments have to do with such matters as:
*  Whether each local entity will have autonomy in designing the compensation package.
If so, whether it is necessary or desirable to rationalize the anomalies that will almost
certainly result, or will the market institutions take care of it?
*  If there is to be any degree of relativity between the different tiers of government
entities and between entities in the same tier, what are the best means or mechanisms
for arriving at such relativity? Will such relativities imply a hierarchy among the
organizational entities and if so, is it good or bad?
*  How will the compensation packages take care of the stagnation factor (i.e. situations in
which opportunities  for upward  mobility will be restricted because of the small size of
the personnel structure)?
*  How will incentives for performance be built into the compensation structure so that
they are transparent  and objective?-50 -
*  Will the limited spatial reach of some of the entities not preclude them from having
sufficiently elastic sources of revenue, so that they will be unable to pay compensation
comparable to the private sector? If so, what is the way out?
*  What review mechanism can be designed for each entity, or for groups of entities, so
that salaries and benefits of employees can be protected in real terms on a continuous
basis?
4.  Local accountability
We emphasized  earlier that without an improvement in systemic accountability, many
civil service reform measures are unlikely to raise efficiency or equity and may, in certain
circumstances, even make a bad administrative situation worse.  With regard to local
government,  the issue of accountability is articulated into such questions as:
*  Defining, as much as is possible, the frontiers of political and bureaucratic
accountability for each tier of decentralization. This is perhaps  more important  at the
lower tiers, where institutions are likely to be undeveloped,  policy-making and
executive roles often unclear and checks and balances absent;
- Providing  quick and inexpensive methods and structures for redressing citizens'
grievances against the civil servants, as well as similar steps to protect civil servants
from undue political and other forms of harassment. This step, again, is all the more
necessary at lower levels of decentralization, since that is where the citizens' interface
with the structures  of governance is most intimate and frequent, and local issues, which
are often immediate and emotive, tend to generate controversy and passion which can
sometimes escalate beyond anticipation;
*  Devising suitable management  information systems for planning, finances, projects, and
personnel;
*  Ensuring  adequate monitoring and evaluation of all aspects of work;
*  Enlisting the participation of the local community or the stakeholders as the case may
be, which can enhance accountability and improve local government-community
relations. The process of participation itself being a subject by itself, suffice it to say that
participation should not be for form's sake alone, but in the real sense;
*  If there is to be a hierarchy of decentralized entities, even if for specific purposes, the
lines of accountability should be clear and unambiguous;
*  The concept of accountability also extends from the top down, for example in matters of
fiscal devolution  and revenue collection and sharing. Such matters should  be based on
clearly intelligible, rational, objective and quantifiable criteria, to minimize discretion
and ensure a degree of certainty in fiscal flows. Ideally, there could be constitutional
bodies to determine the categories of revenues to be shared, the principles on which
such revenues are to be shared, the modalities of collection and the amounts to be so
shared, between different tiers and between entities in the same tier; and- 51 -
*  The audit function is one which, if properly undertaken  and followed up, can be a
highly visible and effective instrument  for enhancing accountability. While internal
audits have never been known to be as effective as external ones, independent  auditors
will only add to accountability.
5.  Local capacity-building
Civil service reform at the local government level is not only complex and of long
duration, it is also fraught with uncertainty  and risks. This is not only because of sheer numbers
and the difficulties inherent in attempting reforms in so many local bodies, but also because, as
has previously been touched upon, organizations tend to be weaker and more undeveloped  the
lower one goes down the ladder of decentralization.  Four main issues can be singled out
*  Training of civil servants and political executives of local governments  can improve
performance and lead to a better understanding  of each other's roles. Joint retreats and
sensitization sessions, where gender issues, environmental  considerations  and concepts
of participation and governance (among other things) have been introduced, have been
organized to good effect in India;
*  The importance of regular, free and fair elections to local bodies cannot be over-
emphasized. Their absence is often the bane of decentralization, and it is only the
electoral process that can legitimize and fertilize the seeds of local government.  A
politically neutral  and professional civil service is a sine qua non for the objectivity of
the electoral process;
*  Legal institutions too have a prominent role to play. The rule of law often goes by
default due to delay and obstruction in the legal process. With specific reference to local
government  employment, it is worthwhile to establish separate tribunals with exclusive
jurisdiction over service matters, so that reform processes are not obstructed, and also to
ensure that civil servants who have been administratively  wronged can obtain speedy
justice. Nothing is more dismaying for the reform process than the spectacle of a few
disgruntled  employees holding the reform process to ransom by legal obstructionism;
*  In economies making the transition from a centralized to a decentralized system, the
process of transition itself will have to be carefully handled  because many institutions
and market mechanisms will be absent or embryonic.  The importance of realistic
sequencing cannot be over-emphasized.- 52 -
III.  MANAGING CIVIL SERVICE  REFORM: SOME LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE
A.  THE GENERAL  CONDMTIONS  FOR  REFORM
Civil service reform is intractable only in countries saddled with rapacious patrimonial
regimes.  These regimes are by definition uninterested in efficiency and development;  for such
regimes, the real 'risk' of civil service reform is a loss of control.  It is therefore a bad mistake to
assume that all governments  are "obviously" interested in improving the economic conditions
and efficiency of public employees.  On the contrary, for a rapacious unrepresentative  regime
an underpaid,  de-skilled civil service is an asset  it keeps public employees dependent  on the
regime's discretionary largesse for their survival, impels their corruption, precludes  their 'exit'
and turns them into reluctant accomplices.  In these kleptocracies, while there might be
conceivable reasons for certain kinds of external involvement, assistance to strengthen the
efficiency and compensation of the civil service would be a wasteful delusion.  But, in most
cases, civil service reform is difficult but manageable.  We know so, because it has been  managed
(e.g., Malaysia, Uganda).  It is, however, especially complex and of long gestation, and requires
several conditions to have a chance for success. International experience shows that there are
six general conditions for constructive efforts at reform.
1.  "Ownership":  The basic prerequisite
Predictably, the general condition for successful structural civil service reform is
genuine ownership of the reform-by  the government  as a whole if systemic issues are to be
addressed,  or by a major player in government  if the strategy begins with reforms in an
individual  sector or civil service function.  In either case, support  from the highest political
levels is necessary.  Diagnostic and cost-containment measures have less stringent  ownership
requirements-but  without active local involvement at the appropriate  level the returns will be
minimal because of lack of follow-up.  Beyond diagnosis and pure cost-containment, civil
service reforms simply cannot be implemented in a sustainable fashion on the basis of the
stakeholders'  benign neglect, let alone over their opposition.
2.  Long-term vision
A coherent long-term vision is mandatory.  It is important for sustainable reform that
governments flesh out in concrete detail the generic goal of a small, efficient and responsive
civil service, oriented towards providing an enabling environment for the private sector while
protecting important public interests.  Just rhetoric won't do.  To the extent possible, targets
should be quantitative, intended  criteria explicit and timetables specific. Without a coherent
and specific vision of the civil service as it should become,  pragmatism becomes ad-hockery,
public support dissipates and haphazard  reform actions come to a stop.  But  however  fine, the
vision  of a few cannot  be a living guide  for the actions  of the many. the process of involving the
"public" into defining a vision of the profile and behavior of public servants is crucial to its
practical value as a policy guide.- 53 -
3.  Selectivity
Selectivity of intervention is important because it is obviously unrealistic to try and
reform the system all at once.  Interventions should be focused in those sectors (or functions)
which are: (i) important;  (ii) amenable to significant improvement in a reasonable period; and,
a la Hirschman, (iii) likely to generate role-model effects or positive pressures for personnel
management  improvements elsewhere.  Selectivity does not mean picking winners and losers,
or focusing on partial solutions to an inherently systemic problem.  Instead, selectivity  is a
criterion  for optimal  sequencing,  by strengthening in turn different institutional linkages, in the
context of the clear long-term vision mentioned above.
4.  Sensitivity
Sensitivity entails primarily an understanding  of the situation of those affected and of
social constraints.  It is clear that expatriate advisors do not always possess such an
understanding;  but often, local policy-makers and high government  officials are equally out of
touch with the realities of the government personnel system and of the state of public services.
It is essential to identify those who do know such realities first-hand, and listen to them.  As
noted above, a long-range reform program rests on sand if it is elaborated without  consulting
those who have relevant information and those whose cooperation will be needed to
implement the program.
5.  Stamina
Stamina is required  by the long gestation of civil service reforms, which calls for a long-
term investment of imagination and resources and government  willingness to stay the course.
6.  Institutional  capacity
The need for institutional  capacity is evident.  However, capacity need not be pre-
existent: it can be improved as part and parcel of early interventions, so long as the civil service
reform program relies as much as possible on local expertise and is designed with an explicit
training element.
B.  COPING  WITH  THE  TRANSITION:  PRACTICAL  LESSONS  OF INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCE
Despite the importance of a long-term vision for civil service reform, it is the question of
"how to get there from here" that has suffered the worst disregard.  It is not surprising  that,
when faced with the size of the gap between reform goals and civil service realities in many
countries, many reasonable people shy away from any involvement in civil service issues. But
common sense and growing experience point to various ways in which to begin to bridge the
gap.- 54 -
1.  Testing for readiness
It is important  not to assume, but to test, that circumstances are ripe for constructive
efforts at reform.  Among the myriad practical ways for the government  to test its own and the
system's readiness, three can be mentioned:
*  undertake  some specific action, no matter how modest,  as trigger of significant
involvement.  If it proves impossible to take easy initial steps, the hard ones will not
have much of a chance at success. Furthermore, to do so will "flush out" at an early
stage the reform opponents;
*  devise a 'transparency  test' and reality check to open up some part of the personnel
management  or service process to public scrutiny and to begin building public support;
and
*  issue a meaningful public statement of intention concerning civil service issues.
More generally, it is society's  readiness, not the government's,  that is at issue.  As the old
saw has it, in a democracy people get the government  they deserve.  But even in authoritarian
regimes administrative  culture reflects the norms of society at large.  The  behavior  of public
servants  is determined  In part by the  expectations  of the  public. Thus, information, 'best-practice'
dissemination and other ways to raise general public expectations of access to and quality of
services are needed to complement government  efforts targeted to improving civil service
efficiency.
2.  Diagnostic measures:  a constructive beginning
Cost-containment  measures may be the necessary first step when the fiscal burden  of
government  employment has reached unsustainable proportions.  Of course, as argued earlier,
cost containment will not by itself lead to lasting improvements in civil service performance.
By contrast, the structural civil service reform measures offer the possibility of "win-win"
outcomes, but are politically delicate, of long gestation and difficult to implement.  However, in
most cases governments  can initiate factual and analytical work in these areas even when the
probability of actual reforms is a long way off.
Diagnostic activities are both an obvious prerequisite to sensible reform, and a non-
confrontational  first stage of the process-provided  that the results are properly disseminated.
Governments are not always aware of problems in their own administrations  until the facts are
uncovered.  Often, the bare facts make the direction of reform painfully obvious.  (Of the over
100  World Bank operations with significant civil service reform components since 1981,  about
half have included such 'diagnostic' activities-Nunberg  and Nellis, 1991.) Even when political
or social circumstances are not conducive to reform, governments are often interested in
functional reviews, institutional assessments, improvements of personnel information systems,
pilot surveys of user opinions, and the like.  Also constructive in the early stages are
improvements in procedures  for recruitment,  interview and selection of staff.  While they may
not affect the quality of personnel decisions right away, the very availability of better
guidelines can be useful to the administrative units which do wish to improve personnel
selection.- 55 -
Among diagnostic activities, a particularly  good start for reform is a civil service census.
A well-designed census (which will normally require external assistance) yields information
on 'ghost' workers and fraudulent  wage payments, which almost all governments will find
relatively easy to do something about-as  there is no overt constituency for theft.  Also, a
census brings to light major distortions and provides the human resource database necessary
for eventual personnel management improvements.  It is important to stress, however, that if a
civil service census is not accompanied or quickdy  followed by a strengthening  of personnel
systems, the problem of 'ghosts' will reemerge in short order, no lasting improvements in
human resource management will follow, and the credibility of the process will suffer.  To
reiterate, a civil service census is only a start to the civil service reform process, not an end in
itself.
3.  Operational  approaches  to reform
a.  Strengthening the linkages
As already noted, sequencing is very important, i.e., improving recruitment  controls
along with downsizing.  More generally, each reform measure should, ideally, make the next
reform easier. We argued at the beginning of this paper that the limited "capacity to reform"
may be the binding constraint on civil service reform.  It is useful, therefore, to think in terms of
strengthening the  linkages  among components of the new administrative  system which the
government  is trying to put in place, so that each decision is facilitated by the previous  ones. A
specific approach to do so, the "efficient nucleus"  approach, has been developed  (Schiavo-
Campo, 1994),  and used in some transitional economies with initial promising results.
b.  "Efficient  nucleus" versus "enclave"
Action to strengthen linkages and communication channels facilitates but does not in
itself generate the spread  of new rules and efficient organizational practices.  There must also
exist dynamic agents of change that can generate the positive 'messages"  to be transmitted
throughout  the system by the improved communication channels.  These agents, these
"efficient nuclei", must be deliberately created to perform a few key selected public functions;
and spread  new institutions and organization  practices  throughout  the system.
An efficient nucleus should meet the following practical standards:
*  be small;
*  be fiercely meritocratic, in the initial selection and in the evaluation of staff
performance;
*  have flexible and simple procedures;
*  provide adequate compensation for staff.  (As discussed below, this may require fixed-
term contracts without fringe benefits, to permit adequate salaries without
compromising  eventual decisions on fiscally sustainable civil service structure  and
compensation);
*  have adequate material and financial resources;
*  use local talent, with external advisors only when demonstrably  necessary;
*  be transitional, with a clear sunset clause and advance specification of the procedures
for reassignment  of its staff throughout the relevant government agencies; and- 56 -
operate not only to perform specific tasks but also a teaching-by-doing function.
An illustration of the efficient nucleus approach, in the area of public investment,
consists of creating a "visiting team" unit, in the core ministry charged with public investment
responsibility.  The unit would comprise a small number of highly qualified, newly trained
local analysts and an experienced external advisor-all  with excellent communication skills in
addition  to economic competence.  The unit would provide ad hoc assistance to sector
ministries-at  the right points in the PIP cycle-by  sending a visiting team "in residence" for a
brief period of time.  This would combine knowledge of economic methodology with the
specific technical knowledge and sectoral familiarity of ministries' staff.  The team would visit
each sector ministry in turn, and interact with its staff to produce better-quality decisions as
well as some "teaching-by-doing".  The relationship would be one of cooperation and mutual
assistance-because  decisions on actual approval of projects for funding would  be entrusted to
an entirely different core entity.  Such relationship would therefore encourage informal
exchanges of information and advice as and when needed.  When, helped by this mechanism
(and, of course, their own specific training programs), sector ministries have acquired sufficient
project preparation  capacity, the visiting team unit would disband-and  its personnel would be
reassigned to take care of PIP matters within the core ministry as well as lead the work in sector
ministries.
By contrast, it is essential to resist the temptation  to "fence" segments of the new civil
service in order to insulate them from the existing inefficient system.  Enclaves do not work in
institutional  development any more than they do forphysical  developmentprojects.  There are
two basic differences between an efficient nucleus and an enclave. First, an efficient nucleus is
aimed at spreading  institutional improvements throughout  the system.  Second, efficient nuclei
should be encouraged to emerge within an existing organization, to reform it from the inside-
a benign mutation rather than a threat.  By contrast, enclave projects normally either ignore or
bypass the existing organizations.  The organizational strongholds  being bypassed refuse to
wither away, and actively resist and subvert  the reform process.  One major reason for the
negative experience with enclaves is that the enclave approach gives the people  in the existing
organizations no hope to participate in the reform process.
c.  The role of hope
It is important that reforms incorporate positive incentives for all who are still "inside"
the system.  Severance pay, retraining and job placement assistance are, of course, important.
Beyond these measures, however, civil service reform must at least incorporate a potential
benefit for individuals  in the system, the hope  to become part of the new institution, the chance
of turning themselves from losers from the reform to winners.  The individual's  average
probability of access to the new system may be low, but a non-zero average probability
combined with the individuals'  capacity to raise their chances through  personal effort, with the
help of appropriate  training, may suffice to motivate enough people into supporting  the reform.
The key proviso is that there must be absolute confidence in the equality of opportunity  of
access to the new system.  (The implications for governance are, of course, far reaching.)
Governments should have no illusion that incorporating the "role of hope" in civil
service reform programs  can remove, or even substantially reduce, resistance to the reform.  It
can, however, turn many opponents  into supporters;  at the margin, this may make the
difference between success and failure. Also, well-designed and fairly administered  training-- 57 -
for-access programs  can have an important demonstration effect in terms of the principle of
reward  for effort and performance, rather than for political or ideological loyalty.  In any event,
equal opportunity  of access is the right thing to do.
d.  "Internal structural adjustment"
A way of managing the transition from a dysfunctional to a radically different system is
to give individual administrative  units positive incentives to reform, and place the burden of
proof on them.  By analogy to structural  adjustment programs supported  by the World Bank
and the IMF, formulation of a coherent administrative reform program  by the government
permits defining the required adjustment for all ministries, and hence appropriate
'performance criteria' for each. As proposed for Yemen, for example, ministries which meet
those criteria would become eligible to apply the new salary scale and/or  to recruit new
personnel, and/or  benefit from external assistance, but in the context of a 'business plan'
consistent with the overall reform program.  For such an approach to succeed, it is of course
essential to have an autonomous  and credible mechanism of evaluation outside the government
itself. (Of course, if the government is not interested in genuine reform, any such scheme is
only a bureaucratic game; but then, there would be little prospect for genuine reform in the first
place). In Japan, good results have been obtained by having outside agencies as initiators and
arbiters of reform, giving discretion to administrative entities in achieving broad reform goals,
and recognizing the importance of psychological motivation.  In general, although far more
industrialized,  Japan provides  useful lessons for civil service reform in developing  countries
(see Box 12).
In any event, giving the individual administrative  units positive incentives for reform is
consistent both with the concepts of the new institutional economics (see section II. A) and
actual reform experience.  Whatever the internal dynamics of a specific government  may be,
there are always ways--if one looks hard enough and in the right places--to make them work
for reform rather than against it. By its very nature, this argument can be elaborated on only by
reference to the specifics of individual country situations, and not in the context of this general
paper.- 58 -
Box 12.  Japan: The "Bonsai" Approach to a Small  and  Efficient  Civil  Service
In Anne-Marie  Leroy's analogy,  the Japanese approach to the civil  service can be likened to a
"bonsai", the careful grooming and nurturing of a perfectly proportioned and very small system.
A wide array of factual information appears to link Japan's civil  service with its economic
development. In brief,  Japanese civil  servants consist of the 'best and brightest', working long and hard; the
bureaucracy is very sm  all and' has been delberately kept that way; it has been quite responsive to
democratic  political controls;  petty corruption is minimal; retirement comes relatively early and smoothly,
leaving top positions open to be filledbym  individuals in their late 4Os  and early 50s. Meanwhile, many
retiring civil  servants relocate to new positions,  thereby bringing their skills into the service of the private
sector (a phenomenon known as amakudari,  or 'descent from heaven'). Competition among agencies  is also
extensive;  this builds an inventiveness and competition throughout the civil  service that is often lacking in
public sector agencies in other countries.
The Japanese government has also explicitly  pursued, through a variety of measures collectively
known as 'administrative reforms', a persistent objective  of a small, efficient  civil  service. Such measures
include personnel and agency budget limits,  simplification  of regulations, reduction of agency authority,
privatization of SOEs  and reform of the public pension program. Further, the legal structure of public
administration insulates the civil  service as well as the implementation of laws from politics and assists in
maintaining a corps of professional civil  servants. Professionalism  is also enhanced by insulating from
political patronage civil  service recruitment and advancement, and 'by harmonizing the career goals of civil
servants with broader national goals. Also, the civil service has played a crucial and proactive role in
promoting Japan's 'catch-up' economic  and technological  ideology.  This was assisted by the fact that the civil
service and the private sector, instead of jostling  for supremacy over one another, have successfully
cooperated. (Stiglitz,  1996  has identified the cooperation between public and private sectors  as a key factor
for the East Asian "economic miracle".)
4.  Transitioning  to sustainable  and adequate  incentives
In trying  to move  away  from an underperforrming  and  underpaid  civil service, 7without
massive  fiscal implications  or immediate  wholesale  reform,  the following  conclusions  and
transitional  measures  have  emerged  from recent  practice.  It is essential  that  such measures  be a
transition  to something,  and  hence  that  they  be formulated  as part  of a coherent  and  concrete
vision  of reform  and  implemented  as a step  in the sequence  leading  to that reform.  Taken  in
isolation,  instead,  such "transitional"  measures  would  produce  little but the enclaves  which  so
richly failed  throughout  the developing  world.  The list is by no  means  exhaustive:
*  in the acquisition  of 'new  blood',  it is possible  to create  a two-tier  system  (as in Poland)
whereby  new  staff are recruited  at the new salary  scale and  are expected  to meet higher
standards  of qualification.  Over  time,  the new  system  will expand  and  the old one
contract,  eventually  leading  to a unified  system  with  better-qualified,  better-paid  staff.
Like dual  exchange  rate  systems,  this  approach  is workable  only if it is transitory;
*  even  at existing  inadequate  salaries,  young,  better-trained  people  can be induced  to join
for limited  periods  if given  challenging  responsibilities  and  solid  training  (as in
Estonia).  When they  leave, others  can be recruited.  The training  requirements  within
the government  sector are semi-permanent,  but the capacity  of the economy  as a whole- 59 -
the government  sector are semi-permanent, but the capacity of the economy as a whole
is enhanced; general understanding  of the work of government is improved; the average
performance of government  employees rises; and positive models are offered to
permanent  employees for their own betterment;
special transitional arrangements for contract employees (higher-skilled, paid above the
existing scale) can be workable (as in Lebanon), provided  that the allocation of such
contractual posts to government  bodies is decided at high levels; that each appointment
is cleared individually  and personally by the top executive (normally the Prime
Minister); and that these arrangements are part of a genuine transition to an overall
salary reform;
*  to be resolutely avoided is the notion of permitting individual negotiations between
new staff and ministries (as in Guyana).  Such a scheme results in short order in glaring
distortions and inequities, and compromises prospects for sustainable reform.
5.  Other  lessons of experience
In no particular  order of importance, the following are worth mentioning:
*  centralized personnel management systems generally do better on a practical cost-
benefit test than decentralized systems.  (his  consideration in no way affects the
advantages  of disadvantages  of deconcentrating or decentralizing personnel authority,
an important separate issue which should be examined in the context of overall
administrative  decentralization);
*  capacity constraints in developing and transitional  countries suggest traditional,
unified, fixed-increment classification and pay systems (such as those which prevail in
Japan, France, the Netherlands, USA, Germany, Korea, Canada, etc.);
*  simplifications in the grading structure (such as broad-banding,  applied in Australia,
New Zealand, Sweden, etc.) and reduction in the number of job classifications (as in
Dominica, where  100  pay scales were reduced to 14 for middle and lower management)
can provide flexibility in rewarding  difficult-to-attract professional skills;
*  "multiskilling", if undertaken  with appropriate consultation (with unions, as in
Australia), can allow more efficient use of scarce skills by allowing broadly trained staff
to move among a range of skills;
*  upward  feedback  that is, surveying the views of subordinates  on a systematic and
confidential basis, is an essential component of informal evaluation of managers;
*  transitional and reforming countries could explore the Singapore model of wage policy,
which links civil service pay levels and allowances with overall macroeconomic
performance;
*  finally, external assistance, while potentially valuable, also carries special risks for civil
service reform.  The dependence syndrome, which is occasionally generated by
technical assistance for physical investment projects, is very common in technical- 60 -
Box 13. Bolivia: Remedying Donor-Abetted  Administrative  Duality
In the early 1980s,  Bolivia faced a severe economic crisis reflecting ineffective macro-economic
management, political instabilit  and institutional problems, and resulting in acute hyper-inflation
(average of 1600%  during 1980-85). The crisis also led to administrative chaos in the ministries and
affiliated agencies. The structural adjustment process introduced in 1985 demonstrated that these
institutions were not competent to fulfill their roles. This forced political authorities to use specialized
external teams financed by international assistance.  However, while fo  assistance was a good
source of technical support in the short term, it started causing distortions in personnel policies and pay
structure in the public administration, raiding the best personnel and weakening domestic capacity. In
turn, the increasing weakness in domestic capacity began to threaten the sustainabAityv  of the reforms.
The state's central admninistration  in effect now consists of two groups-a  smaller group
receiving support from foreign assistanice  projects, who are the more qualified professionals, and the
larger group remaiuing in the old structure of public administration-underpaid,  less skilled and
spending their time on administrative tasks of little relevance.  The larger group are also demoralized
due to absence of a career development path and political interference in hiring and promotion.  The
existence of a privileged professional group in public administration, also made difficult the consistent
application of personnel policies.
A pubihc  administrative reform program designed to rectruitand tetain theimostquaified
personnel aims to accomplish the objectives through downsigin  modernzingand  restructurinzg  the
public sector.  The ratio of support  staff will be reduced from 5:2'to 2:3 resulting i  a total staff reduction
of 41%. Wages will be increased more than proportionately, on balance increasing the wage bill by 45%
over a ten-year period.  However, this total increase of US$24.4A  illion represents only 0.3 % of GDP and
0.6 % of public expenditure estimated for the tenth year. Also, the external financing needed will be
lower than the current financing from donor organizations for technical assistance, making the program
financially viable. In effect, remedying the negative impact from short-sighted technical assistance of the
past, will require foreign aid to finance the improvement in incentives needed to return the qualified
local professionals back to the home of their own civil service.
Source:  "Civil Service  Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean"  Chaudhry, Reid and Malik, 1994
C.  A CONCLUDING  WORD
The subtitle  of this  paper  disclaims  any  attempt  at a thorough  and  comprehensive
survey  of all relevant  dimensions  of the relationship  between  the civil service  and  economic
development.  We do  hope  that  our selective  synthesis  has  yielded,  at least, key  reliable  facts to
replace  the frequent  myths  and  shibboleths  concerning  government  employment  and  pay  in
developing  countries,  and  particularly  that  the country-by-country  data  in the Appendix  will
be of practical  use to all those  concerned  with  civil service  problems  in particular  countries  or
sub-region  of the world.  We also hope,  however,  that  our central  message  has  been  clear:  the
mere  facts  concerning  government employment and wages in any country say nothing in and of
themselves about the need or direction of civil service reform. Reformn  recommendations must
rest on a solid basis of country-specific analysis.-61 -
themselves about  the need or direction of civil service reform. Reform recommendations must
rest on a solid basis of country-specific analysis.
We trust, too, that this paper has provided a clear sense of the benefits and costs of
embarking in reforms in this complex, delicate and important area.  In sum, the eventual benefit
of comprehensive reform is a civil service with the size, skill-mix, motivation, professional
ethos and accountability needed to provide quality public services, reduce transactions costs for
the private sector, implement economic policy and execute budgets and investment projects.
The costs  of civil service reform are the substantial required resources and policy attention;
often, but not invariably, a short-term political loss; and loss of credibility and sustainability  of
reform, if this delicate and long-gestation task is approached  on a quick-fix basis.  (For
unrepresentative  regimes, the real cost is loss of political control.)  Clearly, the potential
development impact of genuine reform of the civil service is massive.  However, civil service
reform is only worth doing if it is done well:  in the absence of genuine ownership  by
government,  realistic support by external actors and willingness to stay the course by both
sides, it is far better not to take on a major involvement.  Nonetheless, even then, several
meaningful preparatory  and consensus-building activities can be usefully undertaken.  And, at
a minimum, governments  and development institutions need to keep 'watching briefs' on civil
service issues and stay abreast of the facts-recalling  that the slide of many of today's  "failed
states" began, in part, with the degradation of their civil service.- 62 -
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